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Daily Report
East Europe

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Balkans: 'Sources' Report Vienna B-H Arms Talks 'Difficulties'

AU0406205496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1824 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna, 4 Jun (BETA-AFP)—The Vienna talks on disarmament on the territory of the former Yugoslavia have encountered difficulties 48 hours before the deadline for concluding the talks expires.

The representatives of the five sides—the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serb Republic, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—have not managed to reach an agreement on the maximum amount of arms that each side may retain, reliable sources report.

The representatives of the Bosnian Government and the Federation still claim that Belgrade has not provided precise information on its arms since the beginning of the military, informative talks on 5 January.

The Bosnian Government and the Federation want the new exchange of information to take place between the initialing of the document in Vienna on 6 June and its signing, scheduled to take place in Oslo on 11 June.

They want the FRY's military arsenal, which represents the basis for working out the maximum of allowable arms that the other sides should have, to be determined precisely.

The OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], which chairs the talks, is inclined to the exchange of information taking place on the date of the signing of the document.

Balkans: Agreement on Arms Control Probable on 6 Jun

AU0506121096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0951 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Vienna, 5 Jun (BETA)—The representatives of the Bosnian sides, Croatia, and the FRY are on the verge of reaching an agreement on arms control, a source at the Vienna negotiations on former Yugoslavia arms control said today.

The agreement is expected to determine the maximum quota of tanks, combat aircraft, and artillery pieces in the FRY, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the territories of the former warring sides.

"The chairman (at the negotiations) believes that the agreement will be reached tomorrow, on 6 June. Everything is looking pretty good," a diplomat, who wanted to stay anonymous, said. [passage omitted]

Albania: Hunger Strikers 'Inspired by' North Korean Slogan

AU0406175996 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 4 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Arben Iljazi: "Hunger Strike To Spite the People"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Inspired by the North Korean slogan "Let us eat grass and roots," the Red front's candidates for deputy, routed in the elections, have decided not to eat bread to spite the people who did not let them into the parliament.

"Let Europe have these people like a millstone round its neck for not persuading them to vote for us real liberal democrats," announced Ceka, the president who has shut himself up on hunger strike.

"Our hunger strike will take the democratic shine off European institutions, which have respected the Albanians' blind instincts for supposed real democracy," Mr. Milo said.

"Asceticism is the only honest way for the Center Pole candidates. By cleaning out our insides, we hope that the Albanian people will cleanse their consciences," said Gjinushi, who in his capacity as education minister under Hoxha's rule had the motto "We will eat grass but we will not surrender" included in all of the school textbooks of "moral-political education." [passage omitted]

Albania: Police Chief Responds to PS Accusations

AU0406204596 Tirana ATA in English 1333 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 4 (ATA)—Muhamet Rrumbullaku, chief of Police Commissariat 2, retorted today to the accusations of the left wing press regarding the prevention by police of an illegal meeting of the left opposition last week in the main square of Tirana.

Rrumbullaku said that his declaration came as a result of the announcements of the left press on June 2, 1996 regarding the charges against him by the Socialist Party [PS] leaders. The denouncing material has been sent near the Prosecutor's Office in Tirana to open a penal case under the accusation "For Crimes Against Humanity" included in Article 74 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Albania.

"Considering the very grave denouncing material which runs against my moral principles and function as chief of the commissariat, I declare to the Prosecution Office that it is free to start legal prosecution procedure against me personally and the actions of police forces of the commissariat lead by me," the declaration said.

Albania: Ministry Thanks Citizens for Not Answering PS Calls

AU0406203296 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A spokesman for the Interior Ministry reports that the call by the Socialist Party [PS] to demonstrate illegally today received a deserved and dignified response. The Albanian citizens listened to it and responded with disdain and indifference. The reports the Interior Ministry possess show that some 20 persons responded to this call in Puke. Only 10-15 persons gathered in Lezhe, while the municipality employees and citizens completely refused this call. Some 80 persons gathered in Kukes and about 40 in Kucove. Meanwhile, in Gjirokaster, Fier, Vlore, Tepelene, and Pogradec, rallies were held in a normal manner, according to the permission given by the police with regard to their time and place. About 300 persons took part in a rally in Gjirokaster, about 300-350 in Vlore, some 250 in Tepelene, and about 250 in Pogradec. Some 300 persons gathered in Fier. About 200-250 gathered in front of the PS headquarters in Tirana. There were attempts by groups of 10-15 citizens, mainly old people, to go out into the square. The police forces called on the people to disperse calmly, and the situation was resolved without using force.

Despite the provocations made to the police by some people in front of the building, the situation of order and calm is quite normal in Tirana. There has been no rallies in the districts of Tropoje, Shkoder, Malesi e Madhe, Kruje, Peshkopi, Burrel, Bulqize, Durres, Elbasan, Kavaje, Lushnje, Peqin, Berat, Mallakaster, Erseke, Permet, Gramsh, and Librazhd. The situation of public order and calm is normal in the entire Albania.

The Interior Ministry thanks all the Albanian citizens for the dignified attitude they maintained by respecting the laws and public order, ends the Interior Ministry spokesman.

Albania: Center Pole Communique Demands Repeat Elections

AU0506104096

[FBIS Report] Under the general headline 'Center Pole News Conference—Total War on the Berisha Dictatorship,' Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian on 4 June carries on page 2 a 200-word press communique issued by the Social-Democratic Party [PSD] and the Democratic Alliance [AD] at their joint news conference in Tirana on 3 June, followed by an unattributed 700-word report on this news conference, held by PSD Chairman Skender Gjinushi and AD President Neritan Ceka.

The press communique states:

"The coup d'etat achieved by means of an electoral farce on 26 May was made as clear as daylight to the entire people yesterday on 2 June, in the course of the so-called second round in 10 constituencies, in which Berisha and the Democratic Party [PD] attempted to gently retouch the forcible plunder of the people's free votes one week previously but succeeded only in discrediting themselves further.

"According to our data, confirmed by impartial Albanian and foreign observers, the participation in the second round of voting was minimal. Voters responded en masse to the opposition parties' appeal to boycott the second round. The overwhelming majority of voters stayed at home.

"Yesterday's voting fully proved that the PD is in a minority. Any stubborn attempt on its part to create a minority regime not only increases its responsibility for the scandalous rigging of the elections, but also exacerbates the continuing destabilization of the country. The opposition, the people, and European and U.S. institutions will not reconcile themselves to the rule of a minority on the basis of votes stolen by force.

"In the wake of yesterday's voting, the situation is perfectly clear. In the name of the people's will and for the sake of stability, AD and the PSD, the parties forming the Center Pole, propose that all parties that took part in the 26 May elections should sit down at once at the discussion table to find a way to emerge from the crisis and to restore the normal democratic order."

The report on the news conference, which was said to have focused on "the end of the hunger strike by 72 parliamentary candidates of the Center Pole and the meetings of the delegation of the Albanian opposition at the European Parliament," includes the following exchanges:

"[Unidentified reporter] What proposals are you taking with you to the European Parliament?

"[Center Pole] Our aim is to extract the country from the general crisis into which it has been plunged by the PD with Berisha at its head. We will make our specific proposals, which are: a repetition of the elections at an early date, while the present parliament continues its work until that time. A technical government involving all colors of the spectrum with representatives from different parties will be created. We will put all of the facts at our disposal before the European Parliament in order to persuade it that the elections in Albania not only were not free and democratic, but were also entirely manipulated throughout the country.

"[Reporter] What call do you issue to the people for tomorrow's demonstrations?

"[Center Pole] The Albanian people are well aware of the outrage done to them by Berisha's regime, and it is therefore up to them to decide their own destinies. The people cannot in any way accept the violation of their free ballot. We call on them not to make any concession.

"[Reporter] What would you say in connection with the commentary broadcast by Albanian Radio-Television about the hunger strike of the Center Pole candidates?

"[Center Pole] The television was a direct participant in the coup d'etat organized in Albania on 26 May. It is a mercenary of the regime and has now become an appendage to the National Intelligence Service [ShIK], which devises foul conspiracies.

"[Reporter] If the European Parliament asks for partial elections, what will you do?

"[Center Pole] It has so far been admitted that there were serious violations in the 26 May elections. This proves our thesis. We cannot in any way agree to elections being held only in certain constituencies because the irregularities were general and nationwide. We possess facts and documents and will persuade Europe and the United States that the elections in Albania were not conducted normally and that they cannot be legitimate. We will convince them that it was not a matter of rigging the elections in certain constituencies but of decreeing their result throughout the country. The PD has come out with 120 of the 140 deputies in the parliament, which is more than 85 percent. This can only be insanity.

"[Reporter] If the European Parliament asks you to compromise, how far would you go?

"[Center Pole] We would not accept any kind of compromise. In this case we would play the role of intermediary between the Albanian people and the European parliament. We are ready to give Europe all the documentation concerning the violations, but Europe must explain to whom we should turn because we cannot present these documents to a commission that is entirely usurped by the ruling party, which was the main culprit for these violations. If this new parliament with representatives selected by stealing the people's votes is accepted, there will be no normal political life in Albania for the next 20 years. We will remain in political life until this parliament is legitimized, and it will then take years to create a new political class.

"[Reporter] Different parties have lodged protests at the Central Electoral Commission over irregularities in 40 constituencies. Have you made any protest of this kind? According to you, who should verify these irregularities?

"[Center Pole] Requests for repeated elections in 40 constituencies have been lodged by four small parties and by the PD in eight constituencies. It is logical that the Socialist Party, the PSD, and AD suffered the worst injustices because they are the country's largest parties. It would therefore be fair for us to protest irregularities in 60-70 constituencies. This would mean repeating the elections in more than 100 constituencies. We have not complained about the details of the manipulation in individual constituencies but about the scenario whereby the PD usurped the commissions, the involvement of the police and the ShIK, the lack of protocols, etc. In our opinion, all the violations must be verified by a pluralist commission in cooperation with foreign observers.

"[Reporter] What do you think of the proposals for solving the crisis made by Kalakulla and Godo?

"[Center Pole] Kalakulla has demonstrated that he represents the serious right wing and is thinking of the good of the Albanian people, while Godo's plan was prepared by Berisha.

"[Reporter] What can you tell us about the meetings you held in foreign embassies in Tirana today?

"[Center Pole] We had meetings at the U.S. and French Embassies. We will also have a meeting at the German Embassy. These are more courtesy meetings in order to inform foreign diplomats in Tirana about what we will discuss with the representatives of the European Parliament in Brussels.

Albania: Center Pole: No Compromise With European Parliament

AU0406200496 Tirana ATA in English
1350 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 4 (ATA)—The Pole of the Center (Democratic Alliance Party and the Social Democratic Party) will not accept any compromise with the European Parliament about a partial re-run of parliamentarian elections that were organised in Albania on May 26, and June 2, 1996, leaders of the Pole of the Center said in a press briefing, according to the newspaper POLI I QENDRES (POLE Of The CENTER).

The chairman of the Social Democratic Party [PSD], Skender Gjinushi, the president of the Democratic Alliance Party [AD], Neritan Ceka, the vice chairman of the Socialist Party [PS], Servet Pellumbi, and the chairman of the Right Wing Democratic Party [PDD], Petrit Kalakula, are invited to the European Parliament in Brussels.

"We are ready to give all the documents on violations, but Europe should made it clearer where should they be addressed to, because we can not present these violations to a Commission that is completely influenced by the party in power, which has the main responsibility for these violations," the leaders of the Pole said.

Meanwhile, according to the documentation presented at the Constitutional Court, the PS, PSD, AD, PDD, as well as the Agrarian Party [PA] and the Party of National Unity [PUK], has presented in this court claims on disapproval by the Central Election Commission of candidates on the base of different reasons, mainly for the fact that the deadline in presenting the documentation has expired and not for reasons related with the procedure of the way the elections were hold.

PS, PSD, AD, PA, PUK and PDD boycotted the first round of elections, on May, 26, three hours ahead of the deadline when 80 per cent of electors has voted. These parties did not took part in the second round of elections, under the pretext that elections were manipulated by the party in power, the Democratic Party, which won the majority in these elections.

According to leaders of the Pole of the Center, they will make the following proposals to the European Parliament: re-run of elections in a near future, continuation of the work of the actual parliament for the period up to the new elections and creation of a technical pluralistic government with representatives from some parties.

"We have not protested for details of manipulations in certain zones, but we have protested against the way of creation of the electoral commissions, dominated by PS, against the involvement of National Information Service [ShIK], against lack of process verbaux," its leaders say.

The meetings that the leaders of the Pole has organised with diplomats of the American and the French embassies and the one they are going to have with the German Embassy in Albania, were considered in yesterday's press conference as "courtesy meetings."

Albania: Socialist Paper Claims Berisha in Retreat

AU0406175596 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT
in Albanian 4 Jun 96 p 3

[Editorial: "All Together To Defend Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Democracy in Albania has suffered serious injuries in the past 10 days. It was first struck on 26 May, when the votes of the Albanian people were stolen openly and by force. It is not important here which party lost and which won seats in the parliament. It was democracy that lost. Democracy's most essential characteristic, the free expression of the people's will for the government of their country, was violated. When this is done away with, there is no more democracy.

The entire Albanian people saw with their own eyes this blow to democracy. Even genuine democrats of the Democratic Party [PD] realize this and openly admit it. They, too, disagree with what happened on 26 May and condemn this blow delivered to democracy.

Democracy suffered its second blow on 28 May. On that day, to defend its stolen victory, the state turned its entire savagery against the people. The state tried to tell the people not to gather in squares or they will suffer broken ribs. This is the logic of a regime that has raised itself against the will of the people.

During these 10 days, democracy has suffered serious injuries but has not died. On the contrary, it has harvested great victories during this period. Its greatest victory has been to discredit Berisha's so-called democracy in the eyes of the world. Until 26 May, the democratic world thought that Berisha was the most suitable man to lead democracy in Albania and, therefore, sometimes openly and sometimes obliquely supported Berisha during the election campaign. However, what happened on 26 and 28 May banished all of the world's illusions about Berisha. The great democracy of the United States has called the 26 May elections "a significant step backward in comparison with the parliamentary elections of 1992" and has said that the irregularities in the elections "cast a shadow over the prospects for the democratic process" in Albania. Criticism of what happened in Albania on 26 and 28 May could not be put more clearly.

By discrediting himself, Berisha also put in a difficult position those democratic forces that supported him. Berisha is now entirely isolated from the democratic world. Nobody now greets or congratulates him. Even in those cases in which Berisha's men fabricate bogus "congratulations," as Foreign Minister Serreqi did in Austria, the world hastens to deny them. The democratic world will no longer take upon itself Berisha's shame.

This is the greatest victory for Albanian democracy during the past 10 days. The credit for this victory goes to the democratic spirit of the Albanian people, and the credit for this spirit goes to the political opposition in Albania.

The second victory of the opposition is that the world is listening to it with greater attention. The democratic world is looking for serious partners in Albania, who will take into their hands the destiny of democracy. It no longer believes Berisha's regime, which states that there was no rigging of the elections, while observers from throughout the world state that manipulation took place. The democratic world no longer believes Berisha, who says that there was no violence in Skenderbeg Square, when the entire world saw the scenes of violence with its own eyes. The world will not fall for Berisha's trick when he says that there were irregularities in only three constituencies, and the elections must be repeated only in them. This too is a victory for the opposition.

Another victory for the opposition is that Berisha and his regime have begun to be scared and to give way under pressure at home and abroad. Berisha started by saying that the elections were entirely free and that there were no irregularities. He was then obliged to say that the irregularities would be corrected in the second round. He was then obliged to admit that there were irregularities in three or four constituencies. He then spread word that there might have been irregularities in up to 40 constituencies. Berisha himself admits that the country is heading for a dangerous situation.

All these things are signs of Berisha's retreat in the face of public opinion at home and abroad. Berisha and his regime are in total confusion, and the situation is out control even in their own party, although PD candidates won in six of the nine constituencies in the second round. The greed of his people knows no limits, and Berisha now has no power to restrain this greed. Berisha is therefore on the retreat, while the opposition has taken the offensive. This offensive will continue until the total triumph of the opposition, until the total triumph of democracy.

This political offensive of the opposition against Berisha and his regime began on 26 May and has continued until today. It will mark another climax today, when people take to the squares to show Berisha and the world that they will not reconcile themselves to Berisha's brand of democracy. Hundreds of thousands of people will gather in the squares today.

During this week, Berisha's regime has striven to create the impression at home and abroad that the Albanian people are happy with the victory of the PD and that the Albanians are calmly taking vacations, buying and selling, making love, and what not, only failing to mention that people are marrying and dying for the love of Berisha. In other words, that credit goes to the PD and Berisha for all these things.

This is a shabby form of propaganda. People have indeed taken vacations and made love. They were born and died in the time of the dictatorships, but this was not to the credit of the dictators. The normality of people's lives does not mean that they are reconciled to a dictatorship.

During the past few days, Berisha's regime has tried to scare people and has striven to create the impression that "it is no use, they will not give way." The regime is trying to shut people up in their melancholy loneliness, making them indifferent to politics. By numbing people in this way, Berisha's regime is trying to tell the world, "Look, people are happy with my rule."

This is a diabolical trick that genuine democrats will not swallow. They will not allow the survival of a regime established by the violent deeds of thugs against the verdict of the people. They will gather in the squares today to protest. Berisha is trying to imitate Enver Hoxha, but the time of Enver Hoxha has gone once and for all.

How will the police behave at today's protests? The police will not make the same mistake they made on 28 May. That black day of last Tuesday will not be repeated because it will mean writing "finis" to Berisha's regime today. The world is still looking at Albania, and the chilling scenes of last Tuesday are still on its television screens.

Any repetition of violence today will not scare the people. On the contrary, it will only inflame their hatred and disgust at those carrying it out.

Today more than ever we need to join together to defend democracy. Democracy can be defended by all legal means, at home, in your neighborhood, in the street, and in the squares. Today is the day to show the world that the Albanians will not accede to an outrage against democracy. The world is watching us and telling us that we hold our destiny in our own hands. Let us all therefore go forth in defense of democracy.

Albania: Proposals To Correct 'Deep Disgrace' of Elections

AU0506102296 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 4 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Ben Morina: "Where Is Albania Going?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The armed phalangists of Agim Shehu, Bashkim Gazidede, Tritan Shehu and other musketeers [bashibozuke] in and out of uniform throughout Albania brought to Sali Berisha last Sunday [26 May] double the requested amount of booty. Some of them returned from the vote-plundering field with saddlebags full, emptying them in the yard of the Presidency. However, they made a mistake that Sali [Berisha] will find hard to forgive them for the rest of his life. Instead of holding their breath until they had reached the Presidency, the phalangists' sergeants-at-arms paid a brief call on Reiz [television announcer Reiz Cico], who for his part immediately informed the people of the Democratic Party's [PD] thumping victory in all the electoral constituencies, including even Skrapar, "which has finally joined Albania!"

Thus Sali had no time to shout at his underlings: "You blockheads, who told you to steal the lot?" He was faced with an accomplished fact, and since Sunday evening his "victory" has had him by the throat. Throughout the week he has been throwing bits of the roast ram of victory to others, but still the feast is too much for him. His first problem is what to do with all the unwanted loot left on his doorstep. The second problem is that this time he did not hoodwink Europe and America but even brought blushes to the cheeks of his business friends, who bear the titles of ambassadors and their deputies throughout Europe. The third problem is [illegible] to remain in politics when you have been thrown out by history as a violator of free elections, the supreme institution of democracy.

The Albanian people will need a long time to recover their faith in free elections. The date of 26 May 1996 has entered their history as a black day. The parties remain in their role as mediators between an outraged people and their illegitimate regime. The obstinate determination of the illegitimate regime to govern with stolen votes could lead very soon to a liquidation of the role of the parties. The people will then be face to face with an illegitimate state. Their resistance and protests over their violated votes, including even extreme sacrifices, are justifiable from every point of view.

In the view of the United States, the voting of 26 May put Albania at least four years back. The Albanians want to point their country forward again. This is beyond dispute.

The issue under discussion today in the headquarters of the opposition parties and the chancelleries of the United States and Europe is how to find a solution to restore the normal democratic order and how to reconcile the will of the people and the regime. There is not much time, and the parties know this. The parties know, depending on developments, that there is a danger of the entire political class that has appeared on the scene and taken shape in the last five years being liquidated within a few weeks. The parties are therefore thinking of a solution, while the illegitimate regime shows no sign of offering dialogue. The illegitimate regime has no doubt lost all hope of receiving support from abroad and has placed all its hopes for reaching the opposite bank on its position at home. It suspects that the Albanian people lack civil courage and do not have the nerve to persist in protests for a free vote. This is a highly mistaken and extremely insulting attitude. Albanian civilization has now raised a people that will not be trampled on. The protests of a civilized people will force the illegitimate regime to the discussion table with the opposition parties, and this is the best solution.

The problem at the moment looks full of snags because dialogue will require Berisha's participation or the presence of Berisha as an arbiter between the parties. Is this possible? Berisha perhaps has a last chance of rendering an important service to democracy, resuming his role as president, chairing a discussion table for the parties, and using his influence to point the way to new, free, and clean elections.

The parties have now put forward their proposals to correct as fast and as far as possible the deep disgrace of 26 May. The Republican Sabri Godo has proposed a constitutional assembly before fall, to be elected on a proportional basis. This assembly will approve a constitution within the first six months of next year, and new elections will be held immediately after this. The Republican Godo has publicly made his participation in the parliament conditional on these proposals being accepted. These unprejudiced proposals are unclear on one point. Does Godo recognize the 26 May parliament or not?

The Democratic Party of the Right, the parties of the Center Pole, and the Socialist, Agrarian, and National Unity parties have advocated the annulment of the 26 May elections and preparations for new elections in the fall. There are nuances and differences among the proposals advanced by all these parties, which each reached this common stand by an independent route. For instance, the Center Pole thinks that, on the basis of the Constitutional Law, the old parliament can be reconvened in order to pave the way for an all-party government that will prepare for new elections. The Democratic Party of the Right thinks that an interparty committee can lay down rules for moving toward new elections. The chancelleries of Europe and the United States, after learning of the irregularities in the elections, are asking for partial elections. It appears that this is an idea to gain time because the notion of "partial" elections is open and undefined. In short, what is clear today is the impossibility of a parliament emerging from the 26 May elections. President Berisha, the PD, and all of the other Albanian parties are facing one of the greatest tests in their lives to restore credibility to Albanian politics, which were given a knockout blow by the 26 May elections. Again, Albania is heading nowhere. Finding a way of reconciling the will of the people with the regime is the last chance for setting off in the direction of Europe.

Bulgaria: Zhelev 'Accepts' Defeat in Primaries

AU0406164896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1500 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Zhelev met today with Anastasiya Mozer and Stefan Savov, cochairmen of the People's Union. Following the meeting, it became clear that the president accepts the results of the presidential elections and that he will express his views on the matter in a special address to the nation. The head of state said that he will continue to actively fulfill his presidential duties.

In the opinion of the People's Union leaders, Prime Minister Videnov's reference to President Zhelev as the former head of state is improper and a sign of arrogance on Videnov's part. Within the next few days, experts will explain why President Zhelev lost the presidential primaries. Stefan Savov said that the People's Union's firm electorate cast their votes for the incumbent head of state, and added that even supporters of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] had supported him. Savov was firmly convinced that the SDS cannot win the actual presidential elections without the help of the People's Union and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. Seconded by Anastasiya Mozer, he declared that the People's Union will work to support Petur Stoyanov's candidature in the autumn presidential election campaign, as it was agreed in the political agreement signed by the opposition.

Bulgaria: Zhelev Addresses Nation on Primaries

AU0406165996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1627 GMT 4 Jun 96

["Address to nation by Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev on the results of the presidential primaries" from the "Something More" news review program—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dear Compatriots:

Today the Political Council of the United Democratic Opposition announced the results of the presidential primaries. On the eve of the primaries, I said that my participation was dictated not by my wish to compete with my partner, but by the need to stop Zhan Videnov. I have kept my word.

The mass turnout for the primaries proved that a new majority is appearing in Bulgarian society that wants change. This new majority said no to turning back the clock. By virtue of the people's vote, I am president of Bulgaria, and as the head of state I represent all Bulgarian citizens. According to my own personal convictions, I am the representative of the democratic community.

In the name of the unity of this community, I declare the following: First, I accept the results of the primary elections, and second, I will support the opposition's united candidate so that Bulgaria once again has a democrat as its president.

I thank all those who gave me their trust. I thank everyone who took part in the presidential primaries. I will remain president of Bulgaria and of all Bulgarian citizens until the end of my term of office.

Bulgaria: Sendov Declines To Run for Presidency

AU0406091496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 4 Jun 96 p 2

[Staff report: "Blagovest Sendov Refuses To Be Leftist Forces' Presidential Candidate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sources at the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] headquarters told KONTINENT yesterday that Blagovest Sendov has sent a letter to 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] saying that he declines to be nominated as the presidential candidate of the leftist forces.

The National Assembly chairman further stresses that he does not want to be an obstacle to the preference of the BSP local organizations, which overwhelmingly indicate that Georgi Pirinski is the best candidate. National Assembly members are saying that Academician Sendov has analyzed the polls and judged that it is wiser to not risk his position as National Assembly chairman for a presidential race with a uncertain outcome.

Sendov's refusal is confusing the BSP leadership, however, because there is no guarantee that the favorite, Pirinski, will not do the same thing at the last moment. According to well-informed sources, Andrey Lukanov has already been developing the "Prime Minister Pirinski" variant. This plan is supported by Aleksandur Lilov, who has several times declared his real discontent with the policy of Videnov's government. As a possible solution, the BSP is thinking about nominating Nikolay Kamov as presidential candidate.

On 28 May, the BSP Executive Bureau decided that regional conferences will be held at which five presidential candidates will be nominated. A commission headed by Vasil Kalinov will summarize the data and report to the BSP Supreme Council on 8 June. It is expected that the ruling party will then nominate the candidates for the posts of president and vice president. According to Krasimir Premyanov, leader of the BSP parliamentary faction, it is possible to prolong the procedure until the end of the month.

Georgi Pirinski was nominated by 30 municipal conferences, Aleksandur Lilov by six, and Blagovest Sendov by three. Nikolay Kamov, Yordan Shkolagerski, and Dimitur Pavlov each have been nominated by one conference. The name of Deputy Ivan Gaytandzhiev was also mentioned in the context of the BSP presidential candidate, but his chances are regarded as minimal.

In his statement at the 11 May BSP conference in Sofia, Zhan Videnov said that he will take into consideration the party members' preferences, but they must also take into consideration the leadership's opinion. The deputies do not exclude the possibility that Videnov, attacked from within and pressed to make changes in the cabinet, will agree to Pirinski as a candidate for the presidency. In this way, one would not be able to reproach him for not listening to the party's voice, and, at the same time, he could parry the foreign minister's possible ambitions to get Videnov's own post.

Bulgaria: Commentary Examines Reluctance About NATO

AU0506100896 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Aleksandur Strezov: "The Deal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite the stipulation that the deal between Russia and NATO on NATO's expansion could fail if Yeltsin loses the elections, the deal is already a fact. In addition, it is not at all sure that some other possible future Russian president would not confirm the deal.

Some people in our country stubbornly view the issue of NATO's expansion as a static and determined issue. They attribute no importance to NATO's role in Bosnia-Herzegovina, France's return to its military organization, expanding the role of NATO's European members, and the alliance's comprehensive reform. All this is only the beginning, because the development continues toward creating an European security system with the participation of Russia. There will probably be many other vicissitudes, but this is what will happen in the final analysis.

With its refusal to express a wish to join NATO, Bulgaria is only harming itself. The West looks differently at the only eastern European country that has not expressed such a wish. Apparently only those who do not want us to declare our candidacy do not understand that we will not join NATO in the foreseeable future, and therefore the "risk" is nonexistent. In addition, we could pose certain conditions for our membership, something for which there already are precedents.

Obviously we needed a demonstration on the part of Russia and NATO that compromises are made because they are a mandatory component of a really dynamic foreign policy, which pursues lofty goals.

Bulgaria: Democratic Left Council Discusses Changes

AU0406174896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Report by Lili Yancheva]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the initiative of the Ecoglasnost Political Club, the Consultative Political Council of the parties making up the Democratic Left held a meeting today at 20 Positano Street [headquarters of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP]. The meeting was attended by the leaders of the three parties.

The council discussed the sociopolitical situation in the country, the BSP Supreme Council decisions of 31 May, and the positions of the other two parties on these issues. The participants reached a coordinated viewpoint regarding the work and the changes required in the Council of Ministers and the other departments of the executive. They affirmed their position on rejecting the no-confidence motion submitted by the opposition.

The Consultative Political Council proposes to hold a joint meeting at the end of this week with the leaderships of the three parties and the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group.

At the moment, the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group is meeting to discuss its legislative work in parliament this week. Dragomir Shopov, deputy chairman of the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and deputy leader of the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group, said that he will not insist that his party be given the Agriculture Ministry.

Bulgaria: BSP Plenum on 8-9 Jun To Adopt Changes

AU0506094596 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 5 Jun 96 pp 1, 5

[Article by Neda Popova and Lidiya Kotseva: "Vuchev, Dimitur Kostov, and Georgi Kostov Fired at Secret Meeting of Council of Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday it became clear that Videnov has agreed to the dismissal of three ministers, while two deputy prime ministers will remain without ministries.

Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov, Culture Minister Georgi Kostov, and Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev will leave the cabinet.

Svetoslav Shivarov and Rumen Gechev will lose their ministries but remain Videnov's deputies. The Ministry of Economy, led by Mr. Gechev, will be eliminated.

These decisions were adopted at a secret meeting at the Council of Ministers that began on Monday at 2100 [1800 GMT] and lasted 12 hours. The meeting was attended by high-ranking Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] leaders, who actually govern Bulgaria.

The biggest dispute involved the fate of Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov. Finally, the participants in the meeting succeeded in convincing Videnov that the agreement with the IMF will not fail if the finance minister is replaced.

People in the corridors at 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters] said that Professor Ivan Angelov, Videnov's economic adviser, resigned on Tuesday afternoon.

Kiril Zhelev, BSP treasurer and chief of the National Assembly Budget Commission, is most frequently mentioned as the candidate for the post of minister of finance.

The most serious candidates for the post of minister of agriculture are Boncho Rashkov, head of the National Assembly Commission on Agriculture, and Kosta Andreev, member of the BSP Supreme Council. Nikola Koychev, the new chief of the BSP Sofia organization, could join the Videnov cabinet. The red Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] has floated the name of Dragomir Shopov, deputy chairman of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, as the future minister of culture. Mr. Shopov said that the BZNS will not insist on keeping the Ministry of Agriculture in its hands.

With this personnel purge, the prime minister is complying with the BSP plenum's decisions on the need for urgent changes in the executive power.

In addition to 20 Positano Street, in recent days the coalition partners have joined in the attacks against the Videnov government. The Ecoglasnost Political Club and the Aleksandur Stamboliyski BZNS have threatened to leave the coalition if the entire economic team is not replaced.

Yesterday morning, Zhan Videnov went straight to 20 Positano Street after the all-night meeting. There the prime minister discussed the upcoming changes in the BSP Executive Bureau with his deputies Georgi Purvanov, Krasimir Premyanov, and Yanaki Stoilov. Later in the day the prime minister summoned the leaders of the coalition partners—the Ecoglasnost Political Club and the Aleksandur Stamboliyski BZNS—to his office. Svetoslav Shivarov, Stefan Gaytandzhiev, Georgi Avramov, and Boris Kolev attended the meeting. Later, Yanaki Stoilov, BSP deputy chairman, and Miroslav Popov, the BSP's official political scientists, joined the meeting. The coalition partners agreed to support Videnov after they heard about the changes in the economic team.

Well-informed sources claim that Mincho Koralski will be the next to lose his post. The minister of labor and social affairs seriously compromised himself when it became known that the money of the "Professional Qualification and Unemployment" Fund is blocked because it was kept in the First Private Bank, which went bankrupt.

As STANDART NEWS has already reported, the election of the BSP presidential candidate will be postponed until after 8 June. The plenum on Saturday and Sunday will deal only with the urgent personnel changes and the no-confidence motion proposed by the opposition, Yanaki Stoilov reported. The membership of the BSP Executive Bureau will be changed on Saturday.

Bulgaria: Cabinet Changes To Be Effected Over Weekend

AU0506110796 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 5 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Svetlana Belousova: "Democratic Left Agreed on Changes in Videnov Cabinet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 4 June, the Democratic Left Political Consultative Council agreed on structural and personnel changes in the cabinet, Boris Kolev, Ecoglasnost deputy chairman, said to journalists.

Deputies said that Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev will be the only minister who will be fully relieved of his functions. Rumen Gechev and Svetoslav Shivarov will remain deputy prime ministers, but the Ministries of Economy and of Agriculture will be headed by new ministers. According to Dragomir Shopov, the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] will not insist of keeping such an important department as the Ministry of Agriculture in its hands. Closing the Ministry of Economy was a variant discussed at the meeting. Dimitur Kostov remains minister of finance in order to complete the negotiations with the IMF and sign the memorandum by the end of June. The Committees on Power Supply and on Postal Services and Communications will become ministries. Lyubomir Kolarov, head of the Committee on Postal Services and Communications, will be relieved of his duties in the executive power.

On Friday, the leaders of the three coalition parties will negotiate on the last details related to the appointment of new ministers, on Saturday the Bulgarian Socialist Party

[BSP] Supreme Council will adopt the changes, and on Sunday the Democratic Left parliamentary faction together with the BSP leaders will adopt the political decision on the changes, Klara Marinova clarified.

The Democratic Left parliamentary faction leadership has adopted the decision that at an extraordinary session on Monday [10 June] the National Assembly must vote on the changes in Zhan Videnov's cabinet. On Tuesday [11 June] at another extraordinary session, the deputies will vote on the no-confidence vote proposed yesterday by the opposition.

Bulgaria: Premyanov Views BSP Character, Leadership

AU0506143696 Sofia ANTENI in Bulgarian 5 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Krasimir Premyanov, chairman of the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, by Svetla Stamenova; place and date not given: "BSP Puts an End to the Tradition of Having Irresponsible Cabinets"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stamenova] Mr. Premyanov, has something changed in the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] since 1989?

[Premyanov] The party's character and ideological foundation changed. From a class party, it turned into a national party and adopted the principle of democratic socialism. Its charter envisaged a manner and forms of party life that turned it into a democratic party. This includes the right to have individual opinions and to disagree with the decisions of the party leadership. However, in its membership, essence, and orientation, the Socialist Party has not changed. [passage omitted]

[Stamenova] Can we assume that the changes in the leadership of the BSP Sofia City Council are the beginning of changes in the BSP Executive Bureau as well?

[Premyanov] I do not know why people are linking those things. If there were changes in the leadership of the BSP Varna organization, this does not mean that changes are imminent in the BSP Plovdiv organization.

[Stamenova] The BSP coalition partners are not united on the issue of Georgi Pirinski candidacy for the post of president, despite the fact that he is the favorite of most of the BSP local organizations. Will the BSP succeed in rallying its membership and reaching unity on this exceptionally important issue?

[Premyanov] The BSP has not determined its candidate yet. One thing is certain—the opinion that Pirinski is the best candidate is predominant and indicates a certain mood. However, this is far from actually determining who the BSP candidate will be.

[Stamenova] Could popular leaders such as Aleksandur Lilov and Andrey Lukanov impose their presidential candidates on the BSP, and what is their influence on BSP policy today?

[Premyanov] The BSP has a leadership elected by the congress. The party policy is determined on a democratic basis within this leadership and in the framework of the activity of the official BSP organs. Lilov and Lukanov are participating in this process by merit of the posts they hold.

[Stamenova] Does the BSP need a new leader?

[Premyanov] Why do you think there is a reason to ask me this question?

[Stamenova] The name of Yanaki Stoilov has been mentioned as "the new prime minister."

[Premyanov] Who could claim this, and on what grounds? I think that is a fabrication. I do not think the mass media has to be stubborn and launch such a fabrication.

Czech Republic: Situation Forces FM To Miss NATO Talks

AU0406162796 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 Jun 96 p 2

[CTK report: "Zieleniec Has Canceled His Meeting With Christopher Because of the Talks on the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The current complicated situation in the talks on forming a new government has forced Josef Zieleniec, foreign minister and Civic Democratic Party [ODS] deputy chairman, to cancel his planned participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council meeting that began in Berlin yesterday. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and his German counterpart, Klaus Kinkel, with whom Zieleniec was supposed to meet during his visit to Berlin, will also have to wait.

"I think that in view of our domestic political situation, this will be understood abroad," said the ministry's spokesman, Vit Kurfurst. The minister will be replaced in Berlin by his first deputy, Alexandr Vondra.

Zieleniec may play a key role in the ongoing talks on forming a government because the Social Democrats have indicated several times in the past that, as opposed to Vaclav Klaus and some other ODS representatives, he is acceptable to them.

Czech Republic: Election Winners View Forming New Government

AU0406135196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Report by "(rep)": "President Havel Wants To Include Milos Zeman in the Talks on the Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Three days after the parliamentary elections, it is obvious that the formation of the new government will take a long time and that this will not happen without complicated bartering between the current coalition and the Social Democrats.

Namely, President Vaclav Havel, who appoints the cabinet, has expressed himself in favor of a government made up of the current coalition and supported by a clear agreement with the Social Democrats.

"It would be ideal if those parties that made up the hitherto coalition were to try to form the future governing coalition. But this is unthinkable without a clear agreement with the party that won the second-highest number of mandates," said Havel after a series of four meetings with the chairmen of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the People's Party, the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], and the Social Democrats.

At the moment, of course, no compromise is taking shape that would induce Zeman's party to express its confidence in a minority government of the ODS, ODA, and the People's Party. It is unacceptable for the Social Democrats to support a cabinet headed by Vaclav Klaus.

"We think this would not be propitious for this country," said Milos Zeman apropos Klaus's remaining in his post as prime minister. Vaclav Klaus reacted in an interview for CNN by stating that Zeman did not win the elections, so he should not determine who will be the prime minister.

The notion of a government other than a Klaus government is absolutely out of the question for the ODS. "Nothing else is being taken into consideration," said ODS Deputy Chairman Libor Novak. "We will not go into a coalition without Klaus, and I also think without Ruml," declared a senior ODS official.

The People's Party, whose chairman was indirectly offered the post of prime minister by Zeman, is also in favor of the president asking the current prime minister to form the government. "We consider this to be correct and logical," said Tomas Rubacek, Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] general secretary. The president refused to say yesterday whether he will entrust Klaus with forming the government.

The coalition parties are conceding, at the most, that the Social Democrats could hold seats in the Chamber's leadership; only KDU-CSL Deputy Chairman Jan Kasal has spoken so far about certain posts in the state administration.

"The Social Democrats will not dictate any conditions for seats in the government. If the ODS gives up a seat, this must be of its own volition," said Jan Ruml, who is unacceptable to Zeman at the head of the Interior Ministry.

The ODS was taken by surprise when the president announced his idea for postelection coalition talks.

The party's deputy chairman, Libor Novak, said the following about Havel's statement: "We had expected that the president would entrust the chairman of the strongest political party with forming the government."

"The president's decision corresponds to what we had been talking about together; I am also satisfied with the current situation," said, on the contrary, ODA Chairman Jan Kalvoda. Zeman also considers the president's course of action to be sensible. "It is important for the Social Democrats to play an active role in parliament," he said yesterday evening. However, he did not specify his demands.

The president said that he will appoint the new prime minister only after the new Chamber of Deputies holds its first meeting and elects its functionaries.

"The question is, however, whether the parliamentary bodies will be constituted. These also require a certain consensus," countered Libor Novak.

What kind of concessions the coalition will make to the Social Democrats could become clear at the constituent session of parliament. However, Zeman yesterday refused categorically to trade the post of parliament chairman for support for a minority Klaus government.

"The results of the elections in our country have, apparently, surprised all sorts of people. In my opinion, however, the state-forming forces have triumphed in these elections," said Havel, who appeared in front of journalists yesterday for the first time since the elections. He said that, in his view, the elections have confirmed the previous trend of the state's domestic and foreign policy and that the country's economic stability is not in danger.

Czech Republic: CSSD Head Interviewed on Election Aftermath

LD0506084696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1925 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Report on interview with Milos Zeman, chairman of the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), by journalist Vladimir Hruby on 4 June; place of interview not given; passages in quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Hruby] Milos Zeman has said he will make the ultimate sacrifice if his party loses the elections or, more precisely, if they fail to defeat the Civic Democratic Party. In that case, he intended to offer his resignation. I asked him if he is going to keep his promise.

"[Zeman] The party's central executive committee is to meet on 15 and 16 June. On 15 June I will deliver a speech in which I will offer my resignation. Acceptance of the resignation will depend entirely on the central executive committee.

"[Hruby] Naturally, it is expected that it will not accept your resignation and that you will continue to be the chairman of the Social Democrats. Does this mean it is a mere gesture?

"[Zeman] I do not think it is a gesture. Each politician should keep all of his promises. I promised that we would gain at least 25 percent of the vote, in North Moravia 30 percent. I also promised that we would defeat the Civic Democratic Party [ODS]. I have not managed to keep this second part of my promise. Let the executive committee decide what conclusions it will draw from this."

[Hruby] [Passage omitted] Milos Zeman explained why he insists that Vaclav Klaus should not be in the government:

"[Zeman] On the basis of an initiative by the president of the Republic, an agreement is emerging according to which the policy statement of the new government, whatever government this may be, should be the result of a dialogue between four political parties. If the three remaining parties are interested in gaining support from the Social Democrats, the policy statement will have to contain a number of demands from our election manifesto. We do not exchange offices for the principles of our election manifesto; that would be betraying our voters.

"Imagine, for example, Vaclav Klaus reading a policy statement and saying: We will allocate funds from the state Budget and thus improve the situation of old-age pensioners because there will be roughly 11 billion korunas a year more for old-age pensions; we will launch a new housing policy model, reform the health-care system, create regional self-administration, create the institution of the ombudsman—that is, a public protector of rights. He would be talking about policies that for the past four years he has strongly opposed in his actions as a politician and in his words. Would you personally regard such a policy statement as convincing?

"[Hruby] Are there any personalities in the ODS who could read such a policy statement?

"[Zeman] I think that even in the ODS there are certain personalities whose attitude toward these demands has been more positive than that of Vaclav Klaus. I do not want to name them now because I do not wish to bring down on them the revenge of their big boss. But, yes, I think there really are such people."

[Hruby] Zeman was reluctant this evening to tell me about any other conditions of the Social Democrats' support for a minority government because he still has more talks ahead of him, just as others have more talks ahead of them. However, I tried to find out at least some of the conditions. [passage omitted] When I asked him whether he wants to become speaker of parliament, he said neither yes nor no.

"[Zeman] As far as parliament is concerned, the Social Democrats need to be able to supervise the government effectively. Parliament is a suitable institution for such supervision. Until now, parliament has been more or less an obedient tool of the previous government.

An increased role for the Social Democrats should undoubtedly contribute to parliament becoming an equal partner of the government and to the legislative and executive powers being properly separated, as should be the case in any democratic society."

[Hruby] [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Zeman Formulates Demands on Personnel Changes

LD0406202596 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1900 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After his meeting today with Civic Democratic Alliance Chairman Jan Kalvoda, Social Democratic Party Chairman Milos Zeman formulated his demands concerning personnel changes in exchange for his support for a minority government coalition. Zeman named current Interior Minister Jan Ruml, Economy Minister Karel Dyba, Labor and Social Affairs Minister Jindrich Vodicka, and Government Office Head Igor Nemec as those who should not regain their ministerial posts.

Czech Republic: Klaus Discusses Postelection Scene

LD0406190896 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1620 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Regular weekly interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Lucie Weissova—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Weissova] Prime Minister, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] has won the elections, but it cannot fully enjoy its victory. We can all agree that the elections have led our country into a difficult situation. Could you try to analyze the reasons for this unexpected situation?

[Klaus] The reasons are evident: There is something fundamental in the country that is changing. Not everybody is on the victorious side. Moreover, the great opening up of the press and the media is leading toward dramatization of the situation, and the problems are being stressed rather than the facts around us. This has caused the situation we have here at present. On the other hand, I know that we received the same percentage of votes as four years ago and our coalition partners as well. So this is not a reversal. Those who succumbed to certain false promises and who think that health care or similar matters can be solved by waving a magic wand must examine their conscience and think whether it was right not to go to the polls or to vote as they voted. But I respect the results and, unfortunately, we must build on them.

[Weissova] Do you think that the differences in the coalition, a poor election campaign or a bad electoral law that did not make it possible for expatriates to vote, contributed their share?

[Klaus] All these contributed their share. Every coalition government is vulnerable because there is always friction in a coalition. I do not want to say whether in our country the friction was above average or just average. But a number of citizens interpreted this as an unhealthy phenomenon. It is unpleasant, but it is a necessity in any coalition government. Of course, it is true that we could have had more long-term plans, but I do not think these matters were crucial. I think various minor things upset some people, not fundamental things.

[Weissova] The ODS has won in the majority of constituencies. The Social Democratic Party [CSSD], however, has won in two of them. One was North Moravia, with the campaign headed by Klaus and Zeman. Do you consider the North Moravian results as your personal defeat?

[Klaus] I do not see it as my personal defeat. Nobody can imagine what would happen in North Moravia if both of us did not run for a seat there. I think these speculations are rather idle. Naturally, I see it as a bad thing that we failed to win in North Moravia, and I am unable to provide an explanation.

[Weissova] You have had your first postelection political talks, you met President Vaclav Havel twice, as far as I know. Havel was fairly optimistic at the news conference yesterday. He said that there was a certain way out of this situation. Do you know what he had in mind?

[Klaus] I think everybody is looking for a certain government combination that would be a continuation of our current government coalition, while the second-strongest party would also have positions in parliament. This seems to me to be the only possible plan. I do not see any other plan because I cannot imagine a government without the ODS. If this were the case, I would see another chance in new elections.

[Weissova] It would not be good at the moment if Vaclav Klaus remained prime minister, Milos Zeman said yesterday. If the current coalition wants to rule efficiently, it requires the support of the CSSD and must yield to some of its demands. How would you react if your resignation were to be such a demand?

[Klaus] I do not want to argue with Mr. Zeman about what is acceptable for us or for him. I must say that we had 3.5 percent more votes than they. But I would not like to reply using the same strong words about how unacceptable Mr. Zeman is for us and for a lot of people in this country. But this is not at issue. The solution of the current situation is at issue. The responsibility we have tells us to be reasonable.

Czech Republic: Daily: Klaus Nervous, Unable To Forgive Lux

AU0406144596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 4 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by "(rep)": "The Coalition Leaders Each Agreed Slightly Differently at the Castle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The chairmen of the governing parties, who came to the Castle one after the other yesterday, have acknowledged that the agreement reached by their precursor with the president differs from what had been agreed upon during the morning with the other party leaders. This fact could also complicate the future talks on forming a government.

That is, in his interview with Havel, Klaus, as opposed to the original morning agreement with Lux and Kalvoda, pushed for the talks on the formation of the government to be entrusted directly to him and not to the whole coalition. "Fortunately, Klaus was the first one there, and, after his talks with the other coalition party leaders, the president did not support the prime minister's proposal," said a senior official from one of the coalition parties. The prime minister has refused to comment on the president's concluding statement.

The morning bilateral talks involving the chairmen of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL] were characterized by nervousness because, for a long time, it was not clear whether KDU-CSL Chairman Josef Lux would meet at all with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.

"Klaus is unable to forgive him because, before he met with him, he met with the chairman of the Social Democrats, which he [Klaus] read about in agency reports," said a senior ODS official. But neither Zeman nor Lux has so far confirmed the meeting.

Eventually, after hesitating for a few hours, Lux himself called the prime minister and went to the government to see him before noon.

According to unofficial reports, the ODS and ODA were anxious about the stance the People's Party would adopt toward Zeman's proposals [on forming a coalition with the Social Democrats with Lux as prime minister]. "The prime minister was very nervous about this because he was not completely certain of Lux's reaction," said a government official who had spoken with Klaus yesterday.

Czech Republic: Social Democrat Leader on Klaus as PM

LD0406201196 Prague CT 1 Television Network in Czech 1730 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Milos Zeman, chairman of the Social Democrats [Czech Social Democratic Party], has said that it cannot be ruled out—before further talks with President Vaclav Havel—that the Social Democrats will definitively reject the possibility of Vaclav Klaus becoming the new prime minister.

Milos Zeman said this after his meeting this afternoon with Josef Lux, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party. Nevertheless, he also said:

[Begin Zeman recording] Imagine Vaclav Klaus standing behind the rostrum in the Czech parliament and saying that he supports regional decentralization, the separation of pension funds from the state budget, the institution of ombudsman or possibly referendum, and other specific measures [these are all policies that Klaus rejected in the past]. [end recording]

Zeman said that was his personal view, which he also communicated to the president of the Republic on 3 June. However, the Social Democrat leader recommended that the Civic Democratic Party:

[Begin Zeman recording] Think hard about whether it values one person's vanity more than reaching an agreement on reasonable forms of cooperation. [end recording]

Czech Republic: KSCM First Party To Constitute Deputies' Club

AU0406163096 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 4 Jun 96 p 3

[CTK report: "The Communists Constituted Their Club First"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] yesterday became the first party to constitute its new deputies' club. Vojtech Filip, a deputy in the former Federal Assembly and currently chairman of the KSCM's expert group for legislation and human rights, was elected the faction's chairman. Zuzka Rujbrova was elected first deputy chairwoman. The first meeting of the parliamentary club of the newly elected Czech Social Democratic Party deputies is scheduled for next Tuesday [11 June]. The date of the first meetings of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, Civic Democratic Party, and Civic Democratic Alliance parliamentary clubs has, so far, not been fixed; obviously, however, the clubs should also be constituted next week.

Czech Republic: ODS Said Considering Early Elections, ODA Merger

AU0406151396 Prague PRAVO in Czech 4 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by "(de)": "Zieleniec Would Not Accept the Office of Prime Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—No senior Civic Democratic Party [ODS] officials intend to accept any kind of call from the leader of the Social Democrats, Milos Zeman, to cooperate in the government, and Foreign Minister and ODS Deputy Chairman Josef Zieleniec would not accept the post of prime minister.

According to our information, consideration within the ODS is being given mainly to the early elections that could be held next spring.

Of course, a condition would be the rapid merger of the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA] with the ODS to ensure that these parties do not weaken one another. However, the stand of some ODA founders is, allegedly, preventing this.

Preparing at least the minimum contents for a coalition agreement and policy statement involving the parties in the current coalition is not being ruled out within the ODS. These documents would be submitted to the Chamber directly without prior consultations with Zeman's Czech Social Democratic Party.

Zeman repeated again on Monday [3 June] that, in his opinion, there are people in the ODS capable of communication. The others do not belong in politics, said Zeman on Czech Television in an obvious allusion to Vaclav Klaus.

Czech Republic: Support for CSSD, KSCM in Army, Police

AU0406084096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 3 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by "(ina, gag)": "The Police and Soldiers Voted for Zeman and the Communists"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The heads of the Army and Interior Ministry are perplexed by the fact that officers from the Army, police, and other armed corps voted mostly for the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM]. According to Saturday's [1 June] estimates by the INFAS [Institute for Applied Social Sciences] and Factum agencies, 38 percent gave their vote to Zeman's party, and 18 percent gave their vote to Grebenicek.

Defense Minister Vilem Holan said that the 18-percent support for the communists is, first and foremost, an unpleasant surprise for him. "This corresponds, unfortunately, to the number of votes that the extremist parties—the KSCM and the republicans—won in the elections," declared Holan. At the same time, however, he added that he is pleased that 82 percent of the soldiers no longer vote for the communists as in previous elections.

Holan's deputy, Miroslav Kalousek (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL]), was also startled by the estimates. "This provides an answer to the question of why it is so hard to promote any progressive changes within the armed forces," he stated.

Deputy Police President Jan Zatorsky said first of all that he had no reason to comment on the polls on the political orientation of police officers. In the end, however, he admitted that he is not surprised by the number of his subordinates who vote for the communists.

How They Voted in Army and Police Force

	Percent
CSSD	38
KSCM	18
ODS	14
SPR-RSC	14
ODA	5
KDU-CSL	4
Others	7

NOTE: ODS = Civic Democratic Party; SPR-RSC = Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia; ODA = Civic Democratic Alliance

Slovakia: Van den Broek on EU Concerns Over Developments

AU0406173296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 4 Jun 96 p 21

[TASR report: "Van den Broek About Concern Over Developments in the Slovak Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels—Speaking before members of the EU-Slovak Republic Joint Parliamentary Committee in Brussels on Monday [3 June], Hans van den Broek, EU commissioner for foreign relations, said that Slovakia had the natural right to become one of the first new members of the EU. However, there exists great concern in the EU over some aspects of the reform process in both the political and economic spheres. The commissioner pointed out that Slovakia had achieved great progress in the sphere of economic growth, for which it can be envied even by the EU. "The EU member states have made it clear in two demarches that some events in Slovakia sow doubts about its commitment to strengthening democracy and consolidating a truly independent civil society with equal rights for all," he observed. Van den Broek pointed out that, in defiance of promises about the early passage of a law on the use of ethnic minorities' languages, for the time being there exist no signals that this is actually going to happen. The recently approved law on foundations could, according to the commissioner, palpably reduce their number. "Slovakia's friends find it difficult to comprehend that new legislation is to erect obstacles to the functioning of nongovernmental organizations," he said. According to him, similar objections concern the Penal Code amendment, which scarcely conforms with the principles of the freedom of association and speech, which are the foundations of every democracy.

Slovakia: Meciar Suffering From Viral Infection

LD0406133596 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] It was reported yesterday that the Slovak- Hungarian-Austrian prime ministers' meeting was postponed owing to Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's ill health. It was officially confirmed in Pozsony [Bratislava] that the Slovak prime minister is suffering from a viral infection of the respiratory organs.

[Correspondent Ildiko Nagy] Hard work has also contributed to the deterioration of his health. Any other information is misleading and does not correspond to the truth. This is how a statement by the Prime Minister's Office explains Vladimir Meciar's three-week absence from government sessions and other official talks. Owing to speculations about the prime minister's illness and treatment, his spokesman also makes it clear in the official statement that Meciar was treated by doctors from an Interior Ministry hospital located near his residence. The question of whether he was treated at home or in the hospital cannot be answered from the statement. The Prime Minister's Office is not willing to give more specific and detailed information on the matter.

According to certain Slovak dailies today, some members of the prime minister's party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, speculate that the prime minister may have a brain tumor. Others claim that a temporary loss of memory could first be seen when he held talks with Russian Patriarch Aleksiy II in Bratislava. It is a fact that since then Meciar has not appeared in public and no official duties are scheduled for Meciar in the government office's preview for this week.

Although the government office has not announced the postponement of the trilateral Austrian-Hungarian-Slovak prime ministers' meeting, sources who do not wish to be identified take it for certain that Vladimir Meciar's appearance in public cannot be expected earlier than the second half of June.

Slovakia: Daily Notes Rumors of Meciar Having Brain Tumor

AU0406145696 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 4 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Juraj Alner, CTK: "Magda Pospisilova: Prime Minister Is Being Treated at Home"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—In an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, Magda Pospisilova, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's spokeswoman, dismissed as "speculation and nonsense" media reports that, during his meeting with Patriarch Alexiy II, "the prime minister's memory failed him." "I was present at that dinner, which was attended by 20 people, and I was sitting very close to him. I know who is spreading this," she said. "It hurt me that Julius Gembicky wrote this in your newspaper last week."

We also received in the editorial office a telephone query whether it is true that the prime minister has a brain tumor. The caller said that "such reports are being spread among Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] members," but he refused to introduce himself. "I can confirm that the prime minister is being treated for a neglected flu," Magda Pospisilova stressed. The prime minister does not feature in the program of government activities for this week issued by the Government Office. "It is not out of the question that this program will undergo changes," Magda Pospisilova said.

Vladimir Meciar is being treated by a female physician from the Slovak Interior Ministry's hospital at Frano Krala street in Bratislava. "However, the prime minister is not hospitalized. I spent two hours with him on Thursday [30 May]. We went over everything concerning his work obligations," Magda Pospisilova said.

The public is also interested in where the prime minister is being treated. There have been divergent reports about this. "He is in home care in Bratislava." Our question: "At home?" "He is being treated at the place where he lives," the prime minister's spokeswoman specified.

Shortly after our conversation, Magda Pospisilova phoned us that the Government Office decided to issue an official report on the prime minister's state of health. [passage omitted]

[The NARODNA OBRODA item of "last week" referred to by the prime minister's spokeswoman is an 800-word commentary by Julius Gembicky on 30 May on page 9, which included the following passage: "Given all the problems he is facing, small wonder that the prime minister does not know which fire to extinguish first. Small wonder that, with his health weakened, he promises Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe High Commissioner Max van der Stoel the formation of purely Hungarian electoral districts, which is in contravention of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, or that, according to information from government circles, he becomes disoriented for a while while receiving Patriarch Alexiy II."]

Slovakia: Anna Nagyova's Influence, Media Presence Viewed

AU0506095396 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "Mrs. Anna Has Stepped Out of the Shadows"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We have known for many years that the influence and the powers of Mrs. Nagyova are far more important than would correspond to her formal status. This is borne out not only by her constant presence at the prime minister's side but also by little details. For example, she felt no inhibitions to criticize, right in front of journalists, her boss's performance in one television debate. After the next "Would You Care To Comment, Mr. Prime Minister?" [television talk show], in turn, she did not conceal her dissatisfaction with the moderator. A few weeks later this very moderator, Dusan Kerny, was given the boot—to Bonn. In spite of her influence, Mrs. Anna remained in the shadows for many years. Last month, however, she stepped out of the shadows into the media limelight. At the beginning of May, an agency report aroused attention about the head of the prime minister's office, whose assignment is to prepare meetings, herself holding talks with a high-ranking Canadian diplomat. Ever since then, the lady director [of the prime minister's secretariat] has been appearing on the STV [Slovak Television] screen in an unusually dense frequency. Not as the person sitting at the side, but as the main protagonist. The credit goes, above all, to Yveta Benikova, STV's "court" reporter for government affairs, but, apparently, also to the new executive chief editor of STV news. Even before a clip on how the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] celebrated Mother's Day, where the speech was delivered by the prime minister and HZDS chairman, a video report showed Anna Nagyova opening an exhibition held under her auspices. A while later we watched children electing her "princess of cleanliness" at Devin [castle ruin near Bratislava]. Later we saw her receiving representatives of the Children's Parliament at the Government Office. Mrs. Benikova broke the absolute record with three features on the fashion show of Slovak designer Lydia Eckhardtova in Bonn, in which Mrs. Nagyova personally took part, which the attentive camera not only always showed but which the reporter never failed especially to point out. Let us add that the designer in question exclusively clothes also the lady director....

The reason that Anna Nagyova, after long years in the shadows, has decided to step into the media limelight is not yet known. The fact is that it happened at a time when the prime minister does not "govern" the way he usually does.

Slovakia: Coalition Leader Slota Views Current Issues

AU3105133196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 30 May 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with SNS Chairman Jan Slota by Nora Sliskova; place and date not given: "The Treaty Will Still Cause a Lot of Trouble"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Sliskova] Will you insist on the approved text of the Amendment to the Penal Code at its new discussion in the parliament?

[Slota] Yes, definitely.

[Sliskova] The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] admitted the possibility, however, of a correction to the controversial articles. If this happens, will you follow suit?

[Slota] If the changes do not affect the merit of individual articles, certain corrections could take place—in the formulation, for instance. Nevertheless, I emphasize that the essence of the articles must not change. I am convinced that the first part of the amendment, which concerns the protection of the state, is in accordance with the Constitution and the Charter of Human Rights. I would accept possible corrections only in the second part, which concerns economic affairs.

[Sliskova] The coalition surprisingly decided to table the aforementioned amendment and the bill on the territorial administrative arrangement only at the June session of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NASR]. It has been rumored that tensions within the coalition in connection with the privatization of the banking institutions are behind this tactic.

[Slota] Someone always makes deductions, others see signs, and yet others have visions. I would not claim that certain differences in opinion do not exist here. I can say, however, that the views held by the Slovak National Party [SNS] and the HZDS on the privatization of financial institutes do not differ. I am not talking about the third party.

[Sliskova] So you can say that the SNS is not causing by its demands any concern to the HZDS? After all everybody remembers the departure of your deputies, for instance, from the parliament debate on the territorial administrative arrangement.

[Slota] For myself, I believe that this entire issue does not concern the aforementioned part of the coalition, i.e., the HZDS and the SNS.

[Sliskova] Does it mean that there are problems with the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]?

[Slota] I am not talking about a problem but about them holding a different view.

[Sliskova] Slovakia is trying for integration into the EU and NATO. Prime Minister Meciar admitted at a recent meeting with foreign correspondents that a certain difference of opinion exists among the coalition partners, but that the government is united. Do you believe that the coalition will maintain this situation?

[Slota] The prime minister may have thought so at the time. I myself believe that the government and the political entities see joining the EU and NATO on such a plane that the people must decide, i.e., with a referendum. We all agree on this point, I do not see any differences. If the nation decides that our entry into these structures would be beneficial for Slovakia, we will join. I am not in favor of rushing into systems. It is not necessary to rush somewhere, where the door is not open to us anyway. Such pushing on our part seems to me almost disgusting. It is not nice.

[Sliskova] Are you willing to accept the idea of the ZRS head about neutrality?

[Slota] The Central European zone is very sensitive, and therefore we should discuss the NATO military corps very carefully. At any rate, I would support joining NATO if communists won in Russia.

[Sliskova] Why do you fear Slovakia's joining the EU and NATO?

[Slota] I will only mention agriculture and industry, which have been slowly rising from ruins ever since 1989. This would reduce them to ruins again. I am convinced that the difference between the West and us is substantial. I doubt that we would be able to keep up with them, and I am talking about a horizon of 10 years.

[Sliskova] Are you aware of the contradiction between what you say and the statements made by the government about Slovakia's excellent economic results?

[Slota] I told you my personal opinion and not the stand of the party. I repeat, whatever happens, I am in favor of a referendum on these issues. There were, for instance, Swedish parliament deputies here recently, and they expressed unequivocally a negative stand regarding entry into the EU.

[Sliskova] A problem that has reverberated on the Slovak political scene for a long time is the conflict between the prime minister and the president. The SNS is not affected by the relationship with the head of the state as much as the HZDS. Do you agree with their opinion that as long as Michal Kovac is president there will not be peace in Slovakia?

[Slota] The situation was brought to a head on both sides particularly at the last session of parliament. I was so disgusted that I did not even attend the last two days. In my opinion, the president does not act as the head of the state should.

[Sliskova] Can you also comment on the conduct of the other party?

[Slota] The other party is my coalition partner, and therefore I will not comment.

[Sliskova] Are you willing to support the change, announced by the prime minister, of the electoral system into a majority one, which is disadvantageous for the SNS and the ZRS?

[Slota] Our party structures definitely oppose it.

[Sliskova] Would you agree that in this way the HZDS intends, among other things, to rid itself of its hitherto coalition partners?

[Slota] The majority system will never pass though the parliament, except perhaps as a fusion of the proportional and the majority systems.

[Sliskova] You have not answered the question.

[Slota] Look, we are intelligent people, and if we look at the same white wall, we cannot have different opinions. It simply is white.

[Sliskova] The program objective of the SNS was to attain independence, and subsequently its protection in the form of the Amendment to the Penal Code. What comes next?

[Slota] The SNS is very sorry that we voted in favor of ratifying the treaty with Hungary. The unhealthy fruit of the unfortunate signature and subsequent ratification is showing already. In the future, the treaty will continue to cause a lot of trouble in Slovakia. The SNS will always fight for the rights and protection of the state-forming nation. For us, the autonomist goals of the Hungarian irredentists in southern Slovakia are not acceptable. We want an opportunity for the Hungarian minority to be educated in the state language and work within the framework of the entire republic. We do not want them to separate. Unfortunately, the Hungarian policy abroad claims white to be black. It has always been deceitful, it is a two-faced policy. They are talking abroad about the way they support their ethnic minorities, but no one will say how within 40 years in Hungary they eliminated the Slovak minority of 400,000. Anyway, where did the Hungarians in Slovakia swarm from? Some were taken out after the war, and there were even Slovaks brought in, and suddenly there are 500,000 Hungarians. The Hungarian fellow citizens are doing well here but, unfortunately, that is not enough for them. They always want more. If one of the Hungarian politicians in the Slovak parliament says that the language law is fascist in nature, he should go to prison to think about it.

[Sliskova] Are you willing to moderate your radicalism?

[Slota] I am willing to debate with anyone, accept all kinds of compromises, but I will never yield in the matter of the rights of the state-forming nation.

[Sliskova] If you are willing to debate, why not with the opposition, which is not represented in the parliament or any other bodies?

[Slota] I am in favor of a compromise on these issues. I am convinced that the incessant struggle on the domestic political scene is dangerous for Slovakia. Of course, a joint session should be initiated of the opposition and the coalition parties, where we would attempt a discussion. Some decisions might be better then.

Slovakia: SNS Criticism of Coalition Discussed

AU0406170696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 3 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Marian Lesko: "The SNS Is Angry and Has Every Reason To Be"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The supreme Slovak National Party [SNS] body met in Zilina on Saturday—not for a regular session, but for an extraordinary one. And extraordinary also was the session's outcome. As have been many people before them, SNS officials have also been alarmed by Prime Minister Meciar's statement about "creating purely Hungarian electoral districts," despite a previous "clarification" of his statement by the Government Office—the prime minister was supposedly only referring to districts in which the Hungarian ethnic minority would be dominant. Formerly the SNS would have been content with such a "clarification," but this time it was tougher on the prime minister—Jan Slota will demand an "explanation" from Meciar. The SNS is really angry, but not because of some statements....

Only last Thursday [30 June] Slota said that the SNS and the HZDS shared the same view on the privatization of financial institutions—the prime minister has been saying for a long time that they should be privatized as quickly as possible. After the Saturday session, the same Slota suddenly claimed that it was necessary to "halt the process of privatizing these financial institutions." The reason why he changed his view so quickly and so radically is a simple one. On Friday the National Property Fund [FNM], which is the majority shareholder in Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company], had recalled three people who in Poistovna were also embodying the interests of the SNS. If Slovenska Poistovna were to be quickly privatized, Slota's party would derive no profit from it. This is why he is angry. Very angry.

During the long parliamentary night of November 1994, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]-Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]-SNS coalition gave the FNM Presidium such powers that it can do in privatization what it pleases. Until now the SNS had no objections to this because the FNM Presidium was doing what prominent SNS officials wanted. After last Friday, when the FNM consummated what the SNS did not in the least desire, this party suddenly wants to convene a special session of Parliament to get the FNM under the supervision of the Supreme Inspection Office [NKU]. Yet this is not everything—it intends to recommend to its coalition partners "the expansion of FNM bodies and the Special Supervisory Body [OKO] for monitoring the activity of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] with opposition representatives." One big and nasty trick by its coalition partner was enough, and the SNS immediately discovered its sense of democracy. Apparently it was saving it as the last resort to be used when the HZDS refuses to honor agreements. Jan Slota says: "As we are coalition partners, all three parties must behave as such." We will see how the prime minister reacts to this. If he does not start behaving "like a coalition partner," he can force the SNS to the worst alternative—its support for opposition proposals.

Slovakia: HZDS Demands Role in Picking Opposition OKO Members

AU0506095496 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 3 Jun 96 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Augustin Marian Huska, deputy chairman of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, by Frantisek Melis; place and date not given: "In Expectation of Tough Questions and Criticism"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Melis] Replying to a journalist's question after the November [1995] meeting of the Joint Parliamentary Committee of the Slovak Republic and the European Union, Herbert Boesch, who headed the European Parliament delegation, said that he knew no country in Europe where the opposition would not participate in supervising the secret services. You have said more than once that you were interested in expanding the Special Supervisory Body [OKO] for monitoring the activities of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] so as to include opposition representatives. At what stage are these talks?

[Huska] We have been holding talks with many parties. Already last November we offered to the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] that it nominate its candidate for the OKO. We were thinking of Jozef Pribilinec, who had been an active officer. He would have been acceptable to us. But the SDL did not accept this then. We still stick to this, and we suppose that this will be realized in the near future. There exist two options. Under the law, the OKO has five members. We will therefore try to achieve that one of the OKO members from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] give up his seat in the OKO, which would then be taken up by an opposition representatives on whom we agree. The other option would be to propose an increase in the number of OKO members, and these new members would be opposition representatives. In these early stages of the state, however, we must make sure that no people get into OKO who were opposed to Slovak statehood.

[Melis] Voices from the opposition have already let themselves be heard concerning what right the HZDS has to want to pick OKO members who will be acceptable to it.

[Huska] The opposition is doing the same thing because the vote on each name is held separately. It crosses out the names of those it does not want or does not trust. Why should we not have this right? We are therefore offering talks in order to reach agreement on this legitimate course of action. We will not resort to any undemocratic method.

Hungary: Simonyi on Need for NATO Membership

AU0406140296 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 3 Jun 96 p 7

[Article by Ambassador Andras Simonyi, head of the Hungarian Atlantic Liaison Office in Brussels: "Our NATO Membership Is Also a Western Interest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At our first meeting following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Danish researcher Mary Dau Hansen, who is not at all cynical and has always sympathized with Central Europe, said: "I do not want to embitter you, but democracies have a rather short memory. Do not believe that the West will be obliged forever by Hungary's historic deeds for the changes. Gratitude (and this has almost become commonplace by now in Hungary) is not a historic category; only interests exist."

Our admission to NATO has nothing to do with any kind of gratitude, only with interests. The West has to ensure that Europe's new democracies become strong and do not remain in a gray security zone and that Europe's stable zone increasingly orient itself toward east. The many, many billions of dollars of investment also cry for stability. It is in Hungary's interest to be organically linked to the family of nations that embodies a common value system, which also guarantees the country's security. Through the Partnership for Peace program, NATO formed increasingly closer cooperation with the new democracies and started their preparation for the expansion. Stable democratic institutional systems were formed in the "leading" ones, the changeover to market economy became irreversible, and they are settling their relations with their neighbors, implementing military reforms, and setting up democratic control of the army. Therefore, the new members will not weaken the alliance's internal cohesion and will not only be consumers of the common security, they themselves will also contribute to it.

Hungary is a small country. It cannot isolate itself from the main processes jointly formed by the institutions—Council of Europe, EU, West European Union [WEU], NATO—that were set up by the western democracies. For Hungary, no sensible alternative exists to integration. Becoming a member of the integration organizations, making full use of our possibilities, we can assert our interests through active participation in decision-making.

Any person believing that Hungary can do this better by staying out of the EU and NATO does not recognize current international reality. He pursues illusions and does not know the country's possibilities for action. People voicing neutrality tend to place security policy on an emotional basis and do not use reality as a basis. Not mentioning that even if NATO membership does not relieve the burdens, it is definitely cheaper in the long run than Swiss or Swedish type neutrality. It has to be seen that efforts aimed at redefining neutrality are increasingly coming to the surface in Sweden, Finland, and Austria.

The two pillars of Euro-Atlantic integration are strongly linked to each other. Whatever the result of the EU's current Intergovernmental Conference [IGC] will be, it is impossible for a European security dimension to emerge which does not maximally rely on NATO. In connection with a new wave of expansion they will not repeat the security guarantee given "through the back door" to neutral countries. Therefore, integration for Hungary is natural because, after all, NATO stands also in the background of the EU's security, whatever happens to the WEU in the future, which is being debated in the framework of the IGC. At the same time, NATO is the most important framework of transatlantic cooperation. It is the guarantee that the United States and Canada will remain strategically interested and committed in Europe.

Leaders of the NATO member states are also aware that for the new democracies, in the bitter period of transformation, the perspective of integration is the most important incentive for accepting the sacrifices that are concomitant with the changes. The alliance will probably be taking on new members until the end of the century. In January 1994 a decision was made on NATO's intention to expand and on the Partnership for Peace program. In 1995 the alliance approved its "expansion study," and in 1996 it is conducting individual consultations with countries interested in membership, including Hungary. The next "phase" is expansion itself. The alliance defined an adequate "speed" for expansion. This makes it possible for NATO, future members, and the international environment in a broader sense to prepare and to form a special relationship with Russia. In the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Finnish political analyst Max Jacobson said: "Now that the process of expansion is so far forward, its coming to a halt would undermine the confidence placed in the United States' European commitment and in NATO."

Today Hungary is a respected NATO partner, as a NATO ambassador put it, a "quasi" ally. The most concrete sign of this is the performance rendered in connection with the Implementation Force [IFOR]—the logistic help given to the U.S. and northern forces, and our participation in Bosnia within the IFOR. For the reception of the IFOR troops in Hungary and for the level of our soldiers' work we only received recognition from NATO commander Joulwan. However, this is not enough for membership. Preparation, mainly in defense, often demands painful measures most of which we are still to face. However, our efforts are appreciated. After his Budapest visit, Solana said: "In Budapest, [I] experienced full agreement among the parliamentary parties on the issue of NATO membership. At the same time, in the area of establishing the necessary structural conditions I have registered unique and serious efforts and results."

Membership will involve rights and commitments. Its conditions and the concrete acceptance of commitment is a matter for Hungary and the alliance. No one else can negotiate over this above the heads of the new members. "Hungarian membership" will be of full value but probably a special one. The outcome will be decided by the Hungarian political and security interests, our possibilities, our future tasks within the alliance, and NATO's interests. This also applies to what solution is achieved in the given case in the issue of stationing allied troops.

I often meet the domestic highest military leaders. I have been able to become convinced that the Hungarian staff of officers who often make superhuman efforts to perform their tasks, see the future of the modern Hungarian Army primarily in NATO.

My impression is that the Hungarian population is not at all indifferent to NATO membership. I am convinced that the majority of citizens who do not yet express their opinion will be in favor of NATO membership. NATO has to be made comprehensible for the population, and it has to be made clear that it is not a mirror image of the Warsaw Pact. It is an organization which can get a key role in the new European security architecture. Information is needed on the benefits and burdens of membership. Naturally, citizens have to know what we are taking on. The role and responsibility of the media cannot be emphasized enough.

A correct, high-quality, and broad debate has to be started on membership. The often very contradictory opinion of thousands of researchers, hundreds of institutions, and dozens of movements will have to be in the background of the consensus which will finally emerge from this debate. In the alliance's member states, social consensus over the issue of NATO membership rests on stable footing as a result of similar clarifying debates. This is what we also need in Hungary. Undoubtedly, after this kind of broad and deep debate, the vast majority of the population will be in favor of our NATO membership both intellectually and emotionally.

Hungary: Socialists Firmly Lead Party Popularity List

AU0406112296 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Jun 96 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report: "The MSZP Continues To Have Considerable Advantage"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The advantage of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] dropped slightly, but the MSZP continues to firmly lead the party popularity list; the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP] occupies second place, while the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] and the Federation of Young Democrats [FIDESZ] are both in third place. All this transpires from the latest national political opinion poll carried out by the Szonda Ipsos Opinion Poll Research Institute.

The previous 7-percent increase in the popularity of the MSZP has now turned into a 4-percent drop, but this did not threaten the party's first place on the popularity list. Support for the FIDESZ grew by 4 percent, and thus this party caught up with the SZDSZ. These are the most interesting results of the latest opinion poll carried out in mid-May 1996.

The top echelons of the parties' popularity list changed after FKGP Chairman Jozsef Torgyan's speech on 14 March 1996. The MSZP shot forward and the FKGP dropped. Those changes proved to be partially lasting because the MSZP preserved its leading position and the FKGP continues to be in second place. However, changes also took place because support for the MSZP dropped by 4 percent: some 19 percent of the people have primary confidence in this party today. Nor did the number of FKGP supporters change in the past month; this party enjoys the confidence of 11 percent of the people.

FIDESZ is the real winner in May. This party has never had such a big number of supporters. FIDESZ had a good year in 1995 as well because their support grew from 4-5 percent to 7-8 percent in that year. This result became steady this year; moreover, FIDESZ improved its situation in May 1996—one-tenth of all the voters would vote for it today. The FIDESZ continues to have considerable reserves—one-tenth of the voters would consider this party as their second choice. The composition of the first and second FIDESZ supporters is very similar—one can find more young people and high-school graduates among them. One can find sympathy toward FIDESZ primarily among SZDSZ supporters and supporters of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. If these people had a second vote, most of them would give it to FIDESZ.

The camp of SZDSZ supporters also grew but only by 1 percent, a statistically insignificant figure. However, it is worth pointing out because this is the first time this year that one-tenth of the voters support this party, and this is SZDSZ's best result this year. The Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP] and the MDF fell behind the FKGP-FIDESZ-SZDSZ triumvirate by 6 and 4 percent respectively. One can increasingly say the public political spectrum is dominated by the six parliamentary parties only. The Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP] and the nonparliamentary parties, including the Workers' Party, only garnered 4 percent in May 1996.

The MSZP is not only the most supported party but also the strongest for the political public opinion. Three-tenths of the people in the survey regard this party as a winner if elections were held today. Two-thirds of MSZP supporters would count on an MSZP victory; only FKGP supporters are more optimistic than that—72 percent of FKGP supporters think their party would triumph.

Hungary: Privatization Official Views Tasks, Prospects

AU0306133596 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 1 Jun 96 p 11

[Interview with Imre Szokai, chairman of the Directorate of the State Privatization and Asset Management Corporation, by Sarolta Osvath; place and date not given: "There Is No Longer Selling Pressure in Privatization"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Osvath] Russian capital has been conspicuously "penetrating" Hungarian privatization. Many people oppose this. Some people say that the old comradely relations are now revived on the basis of business links, and they try to obtain positions in the strategic economic points. What is your opinion about this?

[Szokay] This is a hypothesis; Russian capital is not "advancing." Besides, it practically makes no difference where the greenback is coming from, East or West of the Leitha River; its value is the same. On the level of political confrontations, however, there is some concern about the presence of Russian capital. These people primarily fear for the energy sector, and this fear would be justified if our energy supply were threatened or it led to a dependence situation. However, Russian capital does not play any role in the privatization of the Hungarian energy sector: not in natural gas supply and not in electric power supply. However, one must admit that we have potential. If we can purchase cheaper Russian gas, and it makes no differences whether it comes from the East or West, we cannot afford to buy more expensive supplies because of certain hypotheses. [passage omitted]

[Osvath] Do you agree with the concept according to which it is definitely worth fostering and renewing our former relations with the successor states of the former Soviet Union precisely because of the potential economic advantages?

[Szokay] According to any sober consideration and starting from Hungary's geographic place and the knowledge of the given market, it is worth making use of these possibilities. I do not understand why we should disregard it when the entire Western world, including the French and the Germans, are strongly "penetrating" this market. One can ponder this from political considerations but, on the other hand, one has to consider possible damages and losses. I think that it is in Hungary's basic interest to become an EU member as soon as possible, and the fact that we have good relations with the East is one of our advantages in this endeavor. Proximity to the Warsaw Pact member countries played a decisive role in Austria's economic growth. Thus, Austria could develop special economic cooperation with Hungary, for example, one that was definitely advantageous for them. Why could we not or should we not do the same with our Eastern neighbors?

[Osvath] What tasks is the State Privatization and Asset Management Corporation [APV Rt] facing? What will be put on sale this year?

[Szokay] In January 1996, the APV Rt had assets worth 1,000-1,100 billion forints [Ft]. Out of this, assets that will lastingly remain state property make up about Ft300 billion, and the property to be privatized is worth about Ft500-600 billion. First, we must continue the privatization of the energy sector, the sale of power stations. According to the agreement signed with the Finance Ministry, the APV Rt is also in charge of bank privatization, and our first task is to work out such a concept. The third area is the privatization of large industrial conglomerates and former socialist large enterprises. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Hungarian Businesses in Romania Secretly Financed

LD0206123196 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 2 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a Hungarian press report this morning, the previous government supported with 2 billion forints the creation of businesses by ethnic Hungarians beyond its borders. Effectively it was done in secret because no written records have been kept about the businesses involved.

The affair came to light during a State Audit Office study of state-financed foundations, when the office accidentally stumbled on a 50 million forint deficit in the books. Further investigation revealed that it was the last payment from a special account used to pay out monies of this kind.

All this was reported by the journal SZINES VASARNAP [COLOR SUNDAY]. In an interview with the paper, Ivan Szabo, finance minister at the time, said that on his orders the State Development Joint-Stock Company [Allami Fejlesztesi Reszvenytarsasag], which was under the control of the Finance Ministry, made an out-of-turn payment of over 47 million forints, or $550,000, to the Illes Foundation in 1993. However, the money ended up in the hands of the Hungarian Enterprise Chamber [Magyar Vallalkozasi Kamara], which used it to make investments abroad.

Ivan Szabo also confirmed in his interview in SZINES VASARNAP that the previous government had indeed given assistance of some 2 billion forints to set up businesses abroad. However, it paid for this mostly from the profits of the State Development Joint-Stock Company and not from the central budget, he said.

The above-mentioned 50 million forints were allegedly needed to create a Hungarian-Transylvanian joint venture. However, even Szabo, who was finance minister at the time, has no idea about the identity of the joint venture.

B-H: IFOR Troops In Incident With Serb Civilians

LD0406163796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1316 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 4 Jun (SRNA)—Implementation Force [IFOR] members arrested a Serb civilian in Lukavica this morning for possessing a firearm; the incident nearly turned into an open conflict between onlookers and foreign soldiers.

The incident took place near the Lukavica-based Energoinvest factory when a vehicle was surrounded by 10 IFOR members "armed to the teeth"; they held the driver and the passengers at gunpoint.

According to a statement made for SRNA by Goran Sehovac, commander of the Kula police station, a Serb police patrol was immediately sent to the spot; they literally had to snatch the driver from the grasp of the belligerent IFOR troops.

In a subsequent check, the Serb police established that the driver had a firearms license. Meanwhile, several hundred citizens rallied in front of the police station and vociferously protested over this manhunt against their own kind.

IFOR troops then surrounded the police station and the people, which caused further tension.

Thanks to the timely intervention by the Serb police and negotiations between the leadership of the Novo Sarajevo municipality and IFOR officers, the driver was released, and the people and IFOR soldiers dispersed.

"The Serb police is the only legitimate force in the Serb Republic; it will always react in due time and protect its people," Sehovac concluded.

B-H: French Forces 'Rescue' U.S. Troops From Serbs

AU0406142796 Paris AFP in English 1415 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 4 (AFP)—Around 30 French troops had to rescue four U.S. soldiers Tuesday after hundreds of hostile Serbs surrounded them following their arrest of an armed Serb, a French officer said.

A U.S. officer and three GIs detained the Serb in Kula, an area south of Sarajevo sited within a demilitarised zone created around the capital by the Dayton peace accord.

Lieutenant-Colonel Alain Des Grottes told AFP that when local Serbs saw the man had been detained, a hostile crowd of 200-300 people rapidly gathered and followed them to Kula police station.

"A French officer who witnessed the scene gave the alert," said Des Grottes.

Once the French rapid intervention force arrived Serb police persuaded the crowd to disperse. The pistol and hand-grenade found on the Serb, were confiscated by French gendarmes.

Breaches of the Dayton agreement are dealt with by the authorities for the area where the offense was committed, in this case Serb.

B-H: IFOR Reportedly Tries To Arrest Serb 'Warlord'

AU0406172696 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1528 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, Sarajevo, 4 Jun (BETA)—Today, members of IFOR [Implementation Force] today tried to arrest Warlord Slavko Aleksic, commander of the Serb forces in Grbavica, on the road between Lukavica and Pale.

The incident occurred near the Energoinvest factory in Lukavica when Aleksic's vehicle was stopped and surrounded by 10 armed members of IFOR.

Members of the police from the Kula police station and local Serbs, as Serb sources form Pale claim, reacted quickly and prevented the arrest.

According to the latest information from these sources, the Serb police have taken Warlord Aleksic and his fellow passengers to the Kula police station.

B-H: Attempt To 'Kidnap' Aleksic Reported

LD0406184696 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Jun 96

[No video available]

[FBIS Translated Text] An incident occured in the area of Lukavica today which was caused by members of the U.S. battalion of the Implementation Force [IFOR]. Members of IFOR in three helicopters followed a car in which Slavko Aleksic, former commander of the unit of the [Bosnian] Serb Army which defended the Jewish cemetery, was travelling. On the road through Tvrdimici, IFOR attempted to land a helicopter and kidnap Mr. Aleksic. Aleksic each time successfully evaded the ambush but they caught up with him at the Energoinvest building in Lukavica.

When the IFOR members surrounded Aleksic's car, a large crowd of several thousand citizens of this suburb of Serb Sarajevo gathered and surrounded the U.S. soldiers. Probably surprised by such a reaction by the

Serb people, the members of IFOR said that they were only following Aleksic in order to take away his pistol.

The question is how did they see that Aleksic had a pistol from the helicopter, and whether he actually had one. It is most likely that it was an attempt by the Americans to find out what would happen if they attempted to impose their own order in the Serb Republic. The attempt certainly failed. Bloodshed was narrowly avoided, and the members of IFOR must surely have learned the lesson that it is best to leave the Serbs to live in peace in their own state.

B-H: Paper Claims IFOR To Move Against Brcko Serbs

AU0506135396 Belgrade NEDELJNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jun 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "IFOR Will Enter Brcko on 15 June, Cut Off Banja Luka, and Take Over Control From Sava River to Sabac"]

[FBIS Translated Text] NEDELJNI TELEGRAF's confidential sources in the Serb Republic Army Main headquarters claim that the United States and Germany are working full steam on cutting off economically the western part of the Serb Republic from the FRY. On 15 June, a special Implementation Force [IFOR] battalion, reinforced with a number of Croats and Muslims trained in the United States, is to enter Brcko. Their aim is to topple the city authorities, establish a puppet regime there, which will create certain preconditions so that, when the time comes for the international arbitration, Brcko will be handed over to the Muslim-Croat federation.

The public at large is unaware of the fact that IFOR has recently requested that the FRY Government not use the Sabac port and customs free zone for trade with the Serb Republic. Since IFOR will control the Sava River at Brcko—and if they were to take over control of the port of Sabac—the entire part of the Sava from Bosanski Brod to Sabac would be under their control. At the same time, apart from oil, flour, sugar, and other foodstuffs, all the other goods—particularly strategic material—are under strict control and can barely reach Banja Luka. For some reason, the FRY Government has agreed to this, thus forcing the Banja Luka region to cooperate economically with the Muslim-Croat federation, our sources claim, adding that the Serb Republic, and particularly its western parts, resemble the Republic of Serbian Krajina [formerly Serb-occupied parts of Croatia] just before the fall of Knin.

B-H: Bosnian Disarmament Talks in Vienna 'Stalled'

AU0406173696 Paris AFP in English 1721 GMT 4 Jun 96

[by Odile Meuvret]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, June 4 (AFP)—Bosnian disarmament talks in Vienna were stalled Tuesday, 48 hours from the Thursday deadline fixed by the Dayton peace agreement for them to end.

The five parties involved—Croatia, Yugoslavia and the Bosnian government as well as the Serb and Moslem-Croat states in Bosnia—were unable to agree on ceilings for arms, reliable sources said.

The mainly Moslem Bosnian government and the Moslem-Croat Federation continued to assert that Belgrade was giving inaccurate figures on weapons stocks, in military information meetings going on since January 5.

The government and Federation want a new information exchange to take place between the initialing of the agreement June 6 in Vienna and its signing scheduled for June 11 in Oslo. They want Belgrade's arsenal, the basis for calculating the arms ceilings for all the former warring parties, to be clearly set.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is presiding the talks, is leaning towards an information exchange the day of the signing, the sources said.

Among the questions expected still to crop up was the political status of the five parties set to sign the disarmament accord.

Sarajevo wants the Serb Republic and the Federation to appear clearly in all the articles of the accord as entities of the Bosnian republic but the Serbs want their state treated as the equal of the other parties.

Concerning weapons, Belgrade and Zagreb will lose on their demand to have armored cars of their police and paramilitary units left out of the ceiling calculations, with a deduction that is still being discussed.

How verification is to be carried out, including how international monitors are to operate, is still under discussion.

The agreement is not in doubt; its contents are, sources said. Delegates are working on 80 pages of documents including the accord agreement and protocol measures.

The talks are taking place in application of the Dayton peace accords that last November ended Bosnia's nearly four-year war. Norwegian General Vigleik Eide is presiding for the OSCE.

The final accord is to resemble the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) signed in 1990 by NATO and the Warsaw pact. It will limit five weapons categories—tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces equal to or higher than 75-mm (against 100-mm for the CFE), warplanes and attack helicopters.

If the five parties cannot agree on ceilings for weapons, the Dayton formula will apply, stipulating a ratio of 5/2/2 for the arsenals of Belgrade, Zagreb and Bosnia and 2/1 between the Federation and the Serb republic.

The agreement is designed to establish a new balance of power in the region, forcing Belgrade and the Serb state to reduce their weaponry while giving the Federation room to re-arm and Croatia the chance to increase the number of its tanks and armored vehicles.

B-H: Delic Hints at Alternative to U.S. Arms

MM0406150796 London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 4 Jun 96 pp 1, 6

[Article by As'ad Taha: "Bosnian Army Commander Hints at Alternative to U.S. Arms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo—Bosnian Army Commander Rasim Delic has threatened to turn to "the friendly and allied states that helped us during the war, in order to acquire arms" if international parties, first and foremost the United States, do not fulfill their pledges in this connection.

In a statement to AL-HAYAH, Delic said that he will be compelled to find an alternative to U.S. arms if nothing is done by the middle of this month, the date set by the Dayton peace agreement for lifting the ban on arms exports to his country.

The Bosnian military official stressed that the issue will be settled at a conference on arming Bosnia to be held in Vienna soon. However, he expressed his utmost regret for the stand adopted by the United States, which has not fulfilled the promises it made in 1994 and to which it renewed its commitment in the Dayton agreement last year.

On Washington's excuses for refraining from helping Bosnia militarily, Delic said: "The U.S. Administration is fully aware that there are now no foreign forces among Bosnian Army ranks. It tends to raise this issue for no reason, while it continues to remain silent about the presence of tens of thousands of Serb volunteers from Croatia, who constitute complete military units within the Bosnian Serb militias."

Delic pointed out that his recent tour of the Gulf region succeeded in securing the money needed for arming and training the Bosnian Army. Furthermore, other Islamic states have expressed their willingness to meet the remaining financial requirements.

The Bosnian Army commander accused the Americans of exploiting what they consider contradictions inside the Federation (Muslim-Croat) Army "in order to say that our agreement to their assistance requires the approval of the other side, that is the Croats." He stressed that the Bosnian side is now governed by the Croats' goodwill.

On his assessment of what has been implemented from the military clause of the Dayton agreement, Delic told AL-HAYAH that "the military clause and the civilian clause cannot be separated, because the obstacles facing the implementation of the civilian clause—whether regarding the citizens' freedom of movement, refugees' return to their homes, or their protection—will cause the eruption of military skirmishes that could develop into large-scale battles."

Delic added: "If these obstacles are not resolved, there will be no democratic elections in Bosnia, and ethnic cleansing operations in the areas controlled by the Serbs and the Croats will continue, which would regrettably lead to the eruption of the war once again." However, he warned that this time the war "would not be limited to Bosnia, but would extend to the region as a whole."

Delic believes that his forces benefited a great deal as a result of the halt to the fighting, despite the reduction in personnel, and the combat capability has been raised so that the Bosnian Army can be ready to confront the threat of the eruption of war.

B-H: Steiner: Milosevic Should Do More To Oust Karadzic

AU0506093396 Paris AFP in English 0907 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 5 (AFP)—Bosnia's deputy civilian peace co-ordinator in Bosnia, Michael Steiner, said Wednesday that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic was still not doing enough to oust hardline Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

In an interview with the AVAZ daily, Steiner also called on Bosnian Serbs to dump Karadzic, wanted by the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague to face charges of crimes against humanity and genocide.

"It would be best if it was done by the will of the (Serb) people," he told the Bosnian language newspaper.

"But one thing is for sure, Slobodan Milosevic, despite signing the (Dayton) agreement, hasn't done enough so far," he added.

Steiner's boss, Carl Bildt, has led attempts by the international community to isolate Karadzic, and his military commander Ratko Mladic, and force them to stand trial.

Under the Dayton peace accords which ended last November Bosnia's almost four-year war, indicted war crimes suspects must be handed over to The Hague tribunal and are barred from holding public office or standing for election.

Steiner admitted Bosnia's first postwar general elections, due by mid-September, would be flawed.

"Conditions (for free and fair elections) don't exist now, and I don't think elections in September will be perfect. But I think holding the elections is possible with a minimum of necessary conditions.

"These elections will not be perfect but the next elections will be held in two years' time," he told AVAZ.

The daily is close to the ruling Muslim Democratic Action Party (SDA) of President Alija Izetbegovic.

The top US official for Bosnia, John Kornblum, last week threatened Serbia with renewed sanctions unless Belgrade acted to remove Karadzic from power.

B-H: Bosniak Leader Says New Muslim-Croat War Possible

LD0406170396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1030 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 4 Jun (SRNA)—Adil Zulfikarpasic, leader of the Muslim Bosniak Organization [Muslimansko-Bosnjacka Organizacija], has told the Zagreb-based GLOBUS weekly that a "new war between the [Bosnian] Muslims and Croats" is possible.

He said that Muslim-Croat reconciliation was not willingly achieved and that international policy forced them to become allies.

According to Zulfikarpasic, the Muslim-Croat federation is "nonviable" and a fresh war is more likely than the federation's implementation because all the negotiations are being conducted "with one side holding a knife and the other waving a stick."

He said that "there is no more backing for an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina" and added that the situation in Bosnia is nightmarish; this is a logical consequence of wrong policies conducted by Croat and Muslim leaders.

B-H: SDA, Opposition Attitudes on Mostar Elections

AU0506115996 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 29 May 96 p 6

[Article by S.R.: "Elections Could Be Decided by Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The people of Mostar love their city like nobody else in the world does," says Mirko Pejanovic, president of the Serb Civil Council of Bosnia-Herzegovina [SGV], in anticipation of the city elections, although the SGV has no evaluation of any possible interest on the part of the Serbs from Mostar who are now either in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or in the Serb Republic. The reason for this talk with Pejanovic were some assessments that "the elections in Mostar could be decided by Serbs." According to Ricardo Perez Casado, the European administrator of Mostar, their participation in the elections would be desirable.

According to Pejanovic, this would be "a normal thing." Their participation in the elections was made possible by the Mostar agreement of 25 May; now the organizers of the elections have two problems before them. One is the same for all exiled people. OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the European Union must secure locations for the Mostar elections in the Serb Republic and in Belgrade. According to Pejanovic, the alternative, which is still unrealistic, is to start thinking about organizing transportation to Mostar for those people.

Voting by Mostar Serbs?

Pejanovic illustrated the second problem through the example of Braco Andric and a group of Serbs from Mostar, who were recently prevented from visiting their city by the authorities of the Serb entity. According to Pejanovic, the international community must at least stop Karadzic from preventing the people exiled from Mostar from visiting their homes. According to Mirko Pejanovic, it would be illusory to talk of 20,000 to 23,000 people—which is how many of them left Mostar, according to the evaluations of the SGV—as those who "left the city of their own free will." Besides, the number of those who want to vote for the city authorities of Mostar is not important: The right to vote is both active and passive.

That means that the state must secure conditions for all citizens to vote (and be elected), and that then it is up to them to decide whether they will vote. Seen in that way, things look quite normal—as if there had been no bloody four-year war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as if in Mostar there had not been two. The elections of

Mostar will be a good test for the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The mayor of the eastern part of the city, Safet Orucevic, sees the elections with optimism: Afterwards the city will get one rule, one mayor, and will become one city.... However, the fact remains that the western mayor of Mostar, Mijo Brajkovic, has never withdrawn the statement he made in Koschnik's time: that even the forming of the "nonnational district" in the city center was an "attempt to create a new Yugoslavia." Can the elections change such views?

Changing of Attitudes

The promise of the Executive Committee of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] of Bosnia-Herzegovina given on Sunday, that they would exert maximum efforts to secure the vote of people from Mostar abroad, and their statement that the 25 May agreement had removed some "unacceptable provisions from the election rules," probably mean that the attitude of the other leading party in the city [SDA] on boycotting the elections has changed. Similar announcements come from opposition parties from Bosnia-Herzegovina as well. What is still missing is public statement of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. But the statement of one of the signatories of the Mostar agreement, Mile Puljic, vice president of western Mostar, that the local sides "were not asked for their opinion," and that the Mostar agreement was a result of "agreement between Zagreb and Sarajevo," could mean a lot.

According to some speculations in the Croatian press, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina wanted to hurry up the elections of Mostar, as it was evaluated that now was the right moment to take over power. Taught by the experience of the HDZ in the elections of Zagreb, the Croat politicians from Herzegovina judge that they too are threatened with a certain decline—all the more so as the various factions within the Herzegovina part of the HDZ look much stronger than they are from the outside and, as some observers from Zagreb prognosticate, are even threatened with some form of division. That is, the ideological differences between them are not so big as the differences in the regional and economic interests of individual towns in Herzegovina. Could, then, the elections of Mostar solve the dilemma: How unified is the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina really?

B-H: Krajisnik Skeptical About Election Deadline

LD0306205596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1903 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Nis, 3 Jun (SRNA)—The problems of the Croat-Muslim federation call into question the holding of elections in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina by the planned deadline, Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said today.

Expressing skepticism regarding respect for the set deadlines, Krajisnik said that it was in Mostar, the city divided between Croats and Muslims, that the international mediators were confronted for the first time with problems in organizing the elections.

"Still, the international mediators are trying to put an equation mark in that offense [as received]," the speaker of the Bosnian Serb Assembly said, and added that the Serb side has so far fulfilled everything required of it in the preparation of the elections.

Speaking to Radio Nis on the implementation of the Dayton agreement, Krajisnik warned that the international community through new interpretations "wishes to give it a new approach and, going beyond the obligations undertaken by the Serb Republic, to connect more closely the two entities which are, according to the agreement, only loosely connected.

"We are completely ready and committed to the implementation of the Dayton agreement, but we are not ready to sacrifice the level of independence achieved through this agreement and enable a fresh establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, according to the Dayton agreement, is not a state," the speaker of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic said.

Asked whether the international community has sent economic aid for the reconstruction of the Serb Republic, Krajisnik said:

"Until now the Serb Republic has received almost no aid because such aid is being used as a tool to rob the Serb Republic of its political independence."

B-H: OSCE's 'Fatal Decision' on Elections Viewed

AU0406150696 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by M. Fazlic: "Make a Rough Estimate and Push for It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Ambassador Robert Frowick, chief of the OSCE [Organization for security and Cooperation in Europe] mission, is expected to make a final decision in mid-June on whether the necessary preconditions for holding free and fair elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina announced for September have been established or not.

Ambassador Frowick has a little more than 10 days to make this, for Bosnia-Herzegovina perhaps fatal decision, but, judging from the situation on the ground (particularly in the Serb Republic), he could just as well make it now. That is, the preconditions for holding the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are not only missing, but the situation has even deteriorated over the past month. The freedom of movement, the return of refugees, a neutral political middle line, the freedom of media... are things absolutely that are alien to the Serb Republic and its leadership, which the criminal Karadzic cleansed of would-be moderate members just in time. Besides, in the Serb Republic, the old practice of ethnic cleansing has resumed, which clearly indicates the line and goals followed by the Serb Republic's leadership, which is definitely opposite to the objectives of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. How interested the Serbs really are in fair and free elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina is demonstrated by the fact that officials of the Serb Republic have promptly rejected any cooperation in setting up independent electoral commissions.

Still, regardless of such a situation, there is a quite realistic possibility that Ambassador Frowick might decide that the preconditions for holding the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina are met. Of course, Frowick could not make such a decision on the basis of an objective assessment of the situation on the ground, but rather on the basis of the international community's (and particularly the United States') desire to have the Bosnia-Herzegovina elections held in September this year.

Thus, an OSCE official who did not want to be named told NEW TIMES [as published] that the mission "has been under extreme pressure from Washington and the majority of the Western countries, which want it confirmed that the preconditions for free and fair elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been created," REUTER reports.

What a senior European diplomat involved in the process of assessment of the preconditions for holding the elections stated for TIMES [as published] is also quite interesting:

"This is a formidable dilemma for us. We all know that the situation is bad... but if we do not confirm the elections, then the ethnic division will be preserved and ethnic cleansing will be rewarded. The elections and attempts to establish federal institutions are all we are left with," REUTER reports.

Such an assessment by the senior European diplomat is quite opposite to the opinion held by the ruling and the opposition parties in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which claim that Bosnia-Herzegovina will be ethnically divided and that ethnic cleansing will be rewarded if the preconditions for holding the regular elections are not created. In view of these two attitudes, it is quite apparent which one is correct. That is, if the preconditions are not created, if refugees and displaced persons are not enabled to vote in Visegrad, Zvornik, Prijedor... everybody knows what will happen and who will be rewarded thereby. Regardless of all this, however, the international community still insists on the elections, and the only question is—why? What is the international community's real interest in holding unfair elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the results of which would probably do great damage to the implementation of the peace agreement designed by the international community itself?

B-H: Buha Interviewed on Postwar Situation

AU0506090596 Prague PRAVO in Czech 1 Jun 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Aleksa Buha, "foreign minister of the Serb Republic," by Vera Ivanovicova in Pale; date not given: "To a Large Degree, We Won Our Independence in the War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ivanovicova] Would you say that the Dayton Agreement works?

[Buha] First of all, it has brought us peace, and that understandably is its greatest value. It also brought solutions to the conflict in both a territorial and political sense, decisions, with which neither side—i.e., neither the Serb Republic [RS] nor the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—is completely satisfied. We have always asked that both sides be equally content and dissatisfied because it was apparently such a complex situation that no solution could satisfy both parties.

[Ivanovicova] What is the RS stand regarding the implementation of this agreement?

[Buha] It is well known that we received 49 percent of the territory, despite the Serbian people within former Bosnia-Herzegovina holding 63 percent of the territory. Our territory was reduced not only with respect to the abstract percentage but we were also cheated on a qualitative basis. We also lost the territory of some districts in western Bosnia that were 90 or more percent ethnically Serbian, and at the last moment we were deprived of the largest Serbian city—Sarajevo.

Thus, the international community created something that I call peace refugees. While the Serbs have been accused throughout the war of conducting so-called ethnic purges, the international community itself brought about the greatest exodus in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the peace was signed.

[Ivanovicova] So, what does the status quo mean?

[Buha] We have our own territory, an internationally verified border, our own army and police, and our own legislature. The possibility exists of forming several joint bodies after the elections, but they will only be joint with respect to international relations and trade. Hence, we have not achieved our objective—to be an independent state or join the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—but to a large degree, we won our independence in the war.

I believe that reasons for a new war have passed. Now, that our borders are known, the international community should immediately consider as an aggressor anyone who would attempt to revive the hostilities. As far as we are concerned, we will never cross the border, i.e., the dividing line. For us, the war has ended.

[Ivanovicova] What are relations like with the Yugoslav Federal Republic?

[Buha] It was formulated so that both the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation have the right to special parallel relations with the neighboring states. This means that we have the right to relations with Yugoslavia in all sectors and along all lines that do not harm the federation and, vice versa, the federation has the right to such relations with Croatia.

We have a common currency and monetary system with Yugoslavia, economic cooperation progressed since the end of the war, and we have the same system of education as in Serbia. It could be said that along some lines, we are already internally integrating.

Regarding the federation, it could be necessary to distinguish between what the Croats and what the Muslims do. The Croats integrated with Croatia even more than we with Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, I do not know how it is with the Muslims.

[Ivanovicova] What kind of relationship does the Serb Republic have with Fikret Abdic?

[Buha] We did not fight with Fikret Abdic (a controversial Muslim leader, who lives in exile in Croatia—PRAVO note) in the war. He was a man, who believed that it is necessary to talk instead of engaging in a civil war, and tried to prevent skirmishes between the Serbs and Muslims at least in western Bosnia. This also happened, as far as the so-called Abdic's Muslims are concerned. It has not been received well in the Muslim center, however, and instead of fighting against us, Abdic fought the representatives of Izetbegovic's regime.

It is hard to say whether Abdic could become the leader of all Bosnian Muslims. The elections will show that. I know that he founded a new party, and that he will probably take part in the next elections. It would be difficult to guess whether he will win among the Muslims. I do not care to predict anything.

[Ivanovicova] Is Abdic more acceptable to the Serb Republic as the representative of the Muslim community that President Alija Izetbegovic?

[Buha] I believe that no one has the right to choose a leader for another people or even suggest one. Every nation must select such a person as it finds suitable. The people must decide, and no one outside should force one on them.

[Ivanovicova] What do you think of the accusations of war crimes raised against the Bosnian Serbian representatives?

[Buha] To our war enemies, all Serbs are war criminals. The international community mostly accepted the Muslim propaganda. When referring to the international community, I mean five or six powers. For this community, like for the Muslims—and I will not say all, but to a large degree—the Serbs are criminals. There is not a single person that holds a post in our country, who could not be declared a war criminal tomorrow.

The cases of General Djukic or Colonel Krsmanovic are well known. The fact that President Karadzic and General Mladic have been named only proves that the international community wanted to start, so-to-say, from the top. Once more they wanted to hit the Serbs, their leading personalities, so they could be destroyed this way. The same international community bombed the Serbs even after the peace initiative had been accepted.

[Ivanovicova] How would you assess the work of the International Court in The Hague for War Crimes in former Yugoslavia?

[Buha] The Hague court was not founded to objectively try war criminals. War crimes took place even before the war, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Algeria, Vietnam, etc. So, if the international conscience kicked in, this court should not deal just with war crimes in former Yugoslavia but in general.

Regarding former Yugoslavia, it should be a court for war crimes committed by the first, the second, or the third party. It is obvious today that it was founded only to blacken the Serbs politically and propagandistically also in this manner.

[Ivanovicova] What do you see as the cause of the war in former Yugoslavia?

[Buha] It is difficult to get to the root of the matter. To reveal the cause for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, one needs a long memory. It was established in 1918 from several nations with different traditions, different cultures, historical experience and awareness, different religions. This has always caused problems. Something similar happened also to your state. It was also formed in 1918 of two different nations. It was much more complex with us. No new nationality or supranationality has formed during the 70 years of existence of the first and the second Yugoslavia.

[Ivanovicova] What about the external factors?

[Buha] It is difficult to say whether or not the decisive role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia was played by the internal or the external reasons. I would say that it was most likely a combination of internal and external causes. When the fire started here, it was fed, and this unavoidably resulted in the major fire—the civil war. First in Croatia, then also in Bosnia-Herzegovina. If the international community, once it decided that Yugoslavia is not to exist, tabled some criteria before the conflict had broken out, I believe that the sacrifices and destruction could have been avoided. Some minor conflicts would have taken place, but I do not believe that such a tragic war as the one in Bosnia-Herzegovina would have taken place.

B-H: Chances of Karadzic, Mladic Appearing in Hague

AU0506112196 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 30 May 96 p 4

[Article by Am. Kebo: "Radovan Has Used Shortcut To Escape"]

[FBIS Translated Text] War criminal Radovan Karadzic, according to the reports of the Montenegrin [news] agency MONTENA, and the paper NASA BORBA, which were published on Monday, 15 days ago, had intended to visit Trebinje in order to be present at the religious ritual of transferring the bones of Saint Vasilije Ostroski from Montenegro to Herzegovina. The soldiers of IFOR [Implementation Force], as stated in the articles, noticed the convoy and had the intention to encircle it, but the war criminal succeeded in "squeezing through" by using a shortcut, and ran away to Montenegro. At a news conference held in Sarajevo on Wednesday, IFOR officials said that they had heard about the incident, but that their military sources could not confirm that.

However, if one can judge by the criticism that the mayor of Trebinje, Bozidar Vucurevic, sent to the address of the Serb Television director, Ilija Guzina, because the television did not give enough space to that religious ritual, as well as according to other reports about that event, Karadzic later on returned to Trebinje, where he was present at the ceremony of the transfer of bones.

For the time being, no official can say anything about the limitation of the freedom of movement for the suspected duo Karadzic-Mladic. The high representative of the international community for the civilian implementation of the Dayton agreement, Karl Bildt, was supposed to talk about that with the NATO Secretary General Xavier Solana, which, after all, was announced at the IFOR news conference held on Monday, by the spokesman of the office Colum Murphy. For Solana had earlier said that both Karadzic and Mladic's freedom of movement must be reduced.

Bildt arrived in Sarajevo on Tuesday, and as we wished to hear the high official's commentary, we addressed his spokesman, Michael Maclay, who told us that "we could not expect that the high official to inform us about every meeting and conversation he had with Mr. Solana," and that it was a question that directly depended upon IFOR, and that Bildt could not issue orders to IFOR. He has repeated the stand of the high official that Karadzic and Mladic should be delivered to The Hague, and their field of activity reduced. As stated by Maclay, the confrontation in Belgrade at the meeting with President Slobodan Milosevic, speaks for that.

On the other hand, well-known stands of the high official are related to the support offered to those who are against Karadzic's hard line, as in the removal of Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic, and the mayor of Banja Luka, Predrag Radic, from office, though his only sin was that he had had too many meetings with the representatives of the international community, which had not been organized in accord with Pale. In this case Pale, for the second time, removed one of the disobedient ones who had announced that he would run in the next elections for the SDS [Serb Democratic Party].

B-H: Released Prisoners on Conditions in Sljivovica Camp

969B0027B Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 11 Apr 96 p 9

[Article by Vehid Jahic: "211 Bosniaks Released From Sljivovica: Freedom After 254 Days"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Beside the bus, Serbian police separated out 13 Bosniaks and kept them in captivity, even though they were on the list for release; most of the released camp inmates are from the Srebrenica and Zepa areas; hellish days in the camps.*

Memici, near Tuzla—At around noon on Wednesday, 211 Bosniaks whom the Serbian authorities had been holding captive since 1 August 1995, a total of 254 days, at the Mitrovo Polje and Sljivovica camps crossed into the territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at Memici, a village east of Tuzla, in the direction of Zvornik. According to eyewitness accounts of the released camp inmates, on Wednesday morning Serbian police separated out 11 Bosniaks in front of the bus and kept them in captivity even though they were on the list for release. From the same sources we learned that 54 camp inmates did not check in for the trip to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but are instead waiting to set out for Western countries. As we are reporting this story, we are unable to confirm the cited figures with ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] representatives, who were the intermediaries in the release of the Bosniaks from the Sljivovica camp. The Bosniaks had crossed into Serbia after the fall of Zepa.

Ah, Freedom

The released prisoners were transported as far as Memici in Autoprevoz Cacak buses, and at Memici they were met by Zenicatrans buses and taken to Visoko, Sarajevo, Breza, and Kakanj to join up with their families, who were displaced to those locations.

At around 1200, the buses from Cacak, Serbia arrived at the IFOR checkpoint in Memici. They were met by ICRC officials, government representatives, relatives, and numerous teams of journalists.

"Oh, man, freedom, freedom, freedom, ah freedom," said Aziz Fejzic, 34, from Visegrad as he shook hands and sighed deeply. "If you only knew what that means after 254 days of torture, hunger, uncertainty, fear, confinement, despair, humiliation.... It was especially hard to endure the first and second changing of the camp guards. They beat us for no reason, gave vent to their lowest desires, forced us to learn and sing their anthem and Serb songs. Hunting you like wild game, you did not know why or how long, or whether you would stay alive. If we had at least known at those moments that we would survive, where our families were, who had survived, somehow it would have been easier to endure, but man, you didn't know anything, you simply put up with the beatings and somehow held on to the hope that all this would end. And it did end, by God. Ah, freedom," says Fejzic, alternating between sadness and happiness.

Most of the released camp inmates are from the Srebrenica and Zepa areas and were captured in Zepa during its fall. After that, they ended up in Serbia by various means. All of them were put into camps. Some of them were in the Mitrovo Polje camp, where many people say the living conditions were better, but later they were transferred from that camp to Sljivovica. There they stayed in shacks belonging to the Planum enterprise, with no bathrooms, beds, or heat.

"In Mitrovo Polje we had somewhere to lie, but it was disgusting, because we each received one or two thin slices of bread, really only the crust, that's how thin they were, and one can of food. That was our daily ration. The ICRC registered us there on 4 August, and after about two months we were transferred to Sljivovica, where the living conditions were horrible. Nowhere to lie, nothing to cover oneself with," says Ahmet Ohranovic, 56, hugging his son Muhamed, who also survived the camps.

Daily Torture

Sabit Alic, 26, from Biljaca near Bratunac, neatly dressed in the clothes provided by the ICRC, showed his documents: "This is all I have: ICRC identification and a camp file card. The ICRC registered us in Sljivovica on 19 August," which is confirmed by Evlid Hasanovic, 19, from Srebrenica, Salko Cavkusic, 35, from Visegrad, Alija Kustura, 37, from Jasenica near Rogatica, and others.

It is hard to talk to the released inmates about anything other than their life, or rather their torments, during their captivity. There were also minors among them, such as Dzevdet Arifovic, 17, from Srebrenica, Edib Vatres, 15, from Zepa, and many other young men whom we could not locate in the general throng.

"Of course they beat us. Even at my age they beat me, first in the Mitrovo Polje camp, near Kopaonik, several kilometers from Brus, and then in Sljivovica too. They were riff-raff and scum, I don't even know what to call them," says Mehmed Muminovic, 55, a rather tall and lean man from Zepa, as he places a black knit cap on his head.

Special torture was endured by those camp inmates suspected of having organized resistance to the aggressor.

"The prison guards gave vent to their lowest desires and beat us without interruption, but some of them meted out special 'treatment,' demanding that we say what they expected to hear. The worst fate befell Ago Dizdarevic. They beat him the most, and teams of thugs switched off on him while the others watched. They demanded that he admit to all sorts of things, whether or not he knew about them. He endured hell, and a good number of them were treated differently, especially during the first two months," says Munib Habibovic from Krusev Do near Zepa, whose story is confirmed by Abdulah Karic from Luka near Srebrenica, Avdo Mandzic from Krusev Do, Azur Harbas from Skelani near Srebrenica, Esad Lemes, 36, from Srebrenica, and others.

According to the accounts of the majority of the inmates, they underwent the greatest torture in the first two months, while later it "subsided" a little but never ended entirely.

"It should be said that they did not torture us a great deal only in the last two months, but we lived a hard camp life," says Sevko Omerovic, 43, from Radjanovici near Srebrenica, which is confirmed by Mujo and Esad Sulejmanovic, 45 and 29, from Klotijevac near Srebrenica.

Camp Tedium

How they lived is best evidenced by the stories told by Ismet Mehanovic, 51, from Srebrenica, Ahmet Pjeva, 37, from Visegrad, Hasan Hurem, 45, from Visegrad, and others who contend that they could hardly wait to be called up for work duty, because then they could at least move around and see something or someone, although even that was not pleasant. It was important to change the setting of the camp tedium.

There are plenty of brothers, parents, and children among the released camp inmates. We met Izet Muminic, 42, and his son Nesib. Izet's wife and two other children are in Kakanj. Saban Omerovic from Zepa went with his father and brother, and the rest of the family is in Ilijas. Galib Hadrovic, 28, embraced his brother Hamdija, 24. They are from Zepa, their parents are in Zenica, and Galib's wife and child are in Visoko. Edib Vatres, 15, from Zepa was in the camp with his father Enver and uncles Emir and Amir. There are many such cases. Many of them came of age while in the camp.

[Box, p 9]

Murders

According to the accounts of many camp inmates, many Bosniaks were killed upon entering Serbia. Several of them told the tragic story of Abid Agic, a feeble-minded person who was killed by the aggressor's soldiers, together with his companion, whose name they do not recall.

Moreover, those who crossed into Serbia were met by the Yugoslav army and immediately transported to camps—Sljivovica and Mitrovo Polje.

"I think that there were 770 to 800 Bosniaks in those two camps in August 1995. Some of them later left for abroad, and after the hunger strike by inmates at the Mitrovo Polje camp because of bad food and living conditions, all were transferred to Sljivovica. We heard that the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] had donated a lot for us, but we saw very little of that," says Edhem Kulovac, 46, from Zepa.

Croatia: FM on Talks With Izetbegovic, Milosevic

LD0406172896 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Passages within quotations marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic answered questions from the Chamber of Deputies Foreign Policy Committee. Here is report by Vera Tomasek:

[Tomasek] Minister Granic was asked by members of the committee to report in more detail on the meeting between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Geneva last weekend.

[Granic] "With President Izetbegovic we discussed the number one issue—the defense law, on which we agreed on major things, including the civilian command of the army."

[Tomasek] They also discussed the freedom of the media. It was agreed that a Croat should be the editor in chief of Sarajevo television and a Bosniak [Bosnian Muslim] should be editor in chief of the radio in Mostar [as heard]. The release of prisoners, the holding of the constituent assembly of the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] federation, and the elections in Mostar and throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina were also topics discussed with Izetbegovic. Granic repeated to members of the Foreign Policy Committee Croatia's firm standpoint that both Karadzic and Mladic should be brought to The Hague tribunal.

The opening of a southern and northern air corridor was the first topic of the talks with Milosevic, Minister Granic said, and added that Croatia had refused to discuss any exchange of territory. They also discussed the normalization of relations between Zagreb and Belgrade. Granic announced a possible visit to Belgrade at the end of the month.

[Granic] "This would have to be a thoroughly prepared meeting. We would be interested in discussing our missing persons at this meeting. I would demand that there should be a commission [as heard] present at this meeting, in order to avoid a situation in which we have talks on exchange [of missing persons] and a political agreement, only for this to be blocked at another level."

[Tomasek] We want the processes and pilot programs on the return of people to Croatian Podunavlje [eastern Slavonia region] to be speeded up, and we are also monitoring the demilitarization of this region. Deputies also asked about the date for Croatia's entry into the Council of Europe.

[Granic] "This evening and tomorrow morning we expect them to formulate four to five points."

[Tomasek] These are not new obligations. These points refer to our full support for the peace process and the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, cooperation with The Hague tribunal, the return of Serbs, the election of Zagreb's mayor, and the question of the media.

[Granic] "After this, the program envisages that it is expected that we reply within roughly seven days. This is expected within this period—plus or minus one day. After this, we will have talks again on 24 June, and the government will make a statement. That is the program. If things are positive, we would achieve Croatian membership on 1 or 2, probably on 2 July." [passage omitted]

Croatia: Croatian, Slovene Officials Discuss Refugees' Return

LD0406175996 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Cooperation hitherto between the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia has been successful. This was said in Plitvice where a meeting was held between delegations of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the two states. Here is a report by Krunoslav Prpic:

[Prpic] In Plitvice's Hotel Jezero, delegations of the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, led by Josko Moric, assistant minister of Internal Affairs of Croatia, and Boro Slikar, state secretary in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Slovenia, and colleagues, considered joint preparations for the tourist season and other issues of mutual interest in terms of security.

Special attention in the talks, which are part of the continued successful cooperation between the police of Croatia and Slovenia, was given to the reception of the convoys of refugees which, in accordance with a signed agreement, are to leave the countries of Western Europe for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Josko Moric, assistant minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, made the following brief statement to Croatian Radio-Television in this connection and on the restoration of Ljubljana-Zagreb-Belgrade and Maribor-Zagreb-Belgrade international transit traffic:

[Begin Moric recording] We also discussed the restoration of international transit traffic on the Ljubljana-Zagreb-Belgrade and Maribor-Zagreb-Belgrade routes and other problems in connection with the restoration of international transit traffic on these routes. We agreed to harmonize measures on our state borders and to harmonize measures regarding the control of traffic flows [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia: UN Says Most Slavonian Serbs' Heavy Artillery Withdrawn

AU0506120296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1021 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 5 Jun (BETA)—Most of the Serb heavy artillery was withdrawn from eastern Slavonia several weeks ago, but the process of demilitarization is still going on, said Philip Arnold, spokesman for the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES].

According to him, over the last 48 hours several tanks have crossed from that region into the FRY, and in Baranja yesterday the Belgian Battalion took control of several international border crossings, including Udvar on the border with Hungary.

"The soldiers are returning to their barracks with their weapons, and UNTAES is supervising all this. The weapons will have to be removed from the area or handed over to the UN forces to be destroyed," Arnold said.

Croatia: Stanimirovic Views Demilitarization

AU0406131696 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem is a multiethnic, multinational, and multiconfessional territory and must remain as such," Vojislav Stanimirovic, chairman of the Executive Council of the Serb district of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, said as part of his statement for the Radio Kragujevac "Mark of Time" [Pecat vremena] program.

"Baranja is now the only multiethnic territory in Croatia. For instance, 32 percent of the non-Serb population lives there. Our district is the only multiethnic part of the Croatian territory," said Prime Minister Stanimirovic. Stanimirovic added that the Serbs' survival in the district rests only on those principles and those founded on human rights and the rights of personal property. He reiterated that the initiative of the Vukovar municipal assembly for autonomy or a special status for the district was supported by all municipalities, except Beli Manastir and Tenje, which will do so this week. That initiative will then be discussed by the government and, subsequently, also by the district's assembly. Stanimirovic said that the exodus from the district to the FRY, which was stimulated by part of the former leadership for reasons known to them alone, has been stopped. Asked about the demilitarization process that is to be completed by 20 June, he replied: "It is very positive." The chairman of the Executive Council said that most Serbs have handed over their weapons and that military units have been disbanded, but he warned that the process will now probably come to a standstill, as the latest selective law on amnesty has introduced uncertainty and distrust among the population. "We must overcome the problem," said Stanimirovic repeating. "We are ready to implement the Erdut Agreement and will not deviate from that."

Croatia: Further on Demilitarization of E. Slavonia

LD0406151296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The demilitarization of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem began on 21 May in accordance with a decision adopted by transitional [UN] administrator General Jacques Klein. The remaining artillery pieces, multiple rocket launchers, and other heavy weaponry should be withdrawn to Serbia within 30 days and light weapons should be surrendered or registered with the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES].

During the first stage of demilitarization, the Croatian Serb side was supposed to compile all necessary data on the number of troops, weapons, military equipment, and facilities. However, so far they have only handed over incomplete reports on minefields and several arms depots. According to Major General Slavko Baric, the Croatian president's envoy for military issues, military facilities and equipment in the occupied [Serb-held] area should be handed over to UNTAES today and tomorrow, and it is also expected that [Croatian Serb army commander] Gen. Dusan Loncar will order the disbandment of Serb paramilitary and police units. Baric also said that UNTAES forces had enough resources and determination to complete demilitarization within the envisaged deadline. However, Baric said he did not expect that the Serbs would surrender their light weapons.

If the planned demilitarization is implemented, the mixed [Serb-Croat] police will be able to enter the area and it will be easier to supervise it and its population, Baric said.

Croatia: Slavonian Serbs Demand 'Special Status'

AU0406193796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jun 96 p 3

[Document of the Executive Council of the "Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western

Srem": "The Status of the Serb District of Western Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We believe that the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem should be granted a special status, as it can be justified by objective historical, geographical, ethnic, and political reasons, and it would be the best solution under present circumstances. We would like to make a reminder that the main reason why Croatia was recognized by the European Community (despite the statement of Badinter's Commission that it did not satisfy the criteria for recognition of independence, which was also the attitude of the United States) was that Croatia claimed to be ready to fulfill obligations concerning the special status of certain parts of its territory, where Serbs were in the absolute or relative majority. The recognition of special status would enable the District to remain a multinational, multireligious, and multicultural community, with internationally recognized human rights and principal freedoms respected to the highest degree.

If it is not done—and it is approved by regulations of the Erdut Agreement and Resolution 1037, especially as the obligation concerning special status is still valid for Croatia—the international community would also be guilty of partaking in the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

The District should be organized according to Western democratic principles, in accordance with European ideals and values, and respectful of the will of all its inhabitants, including citizens who have lived there before 1991 and displaced persons from other parts of Croatia who found shelter and a chance for a dignified life in the District, having been denied that in their old homes by the present Croatian authorities.

According to all that, we demand the status of an autonomous and demilitarized district. That status should be regulated by a special Law on the Autonomy of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, which should provide details for the regulation of most important issues of our special status. The Law should be adopted by the Croatian Parliament, in a procedure identical to the adoption of their Constitution, and the Law cannot be modified without consent of our District parliament (assembly).

What the Law Should Include

By autonomy we primarily mean the right to independent adoption of all regulations concerning issues important for the inhabitants of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. That legislative activity is comprised of: organization of the District parliament (assembly) and election of its members; choosing the District's flag, coat of arms, and anthem; District (regional) citizenship; organization of municipal assemblies and election of their members; defining borders between municipalities; district and municipal elections; local budget; order and security in the District; health care; social insurance; education; culture; sports; economy; agriculture and forestry; hunt and fishery; protection of environment and human rights, etc.

The District parliament (assembly) will have legislative power in those fields. Its laws will be called District laws. The president of Croatia gives his consent, and he has the right of veto in case the District parliament stretches its authority.

The District parliament must establish economic self-government in order to ensure development of the District as a free European region, with a model of market that would ensure a fast incorporation of the District into the European economic system and the European integration of regions. We demand our—or other corresponding—currency and our bank. The District Assembly will decide on the district's budget and have at its disposal funds obtained by local taxes, duties, and customs. A certain percentage of funds thus created may be passed on to the Croatian state budget.

Only persons whose place of residence has been in the District for at least six months without interruption have the right to vote for the District and municipal assemblies. That is also one of the most important conditions for acquiring District (area) citizenship. We demand regional citizenship and regional passports for the inhabitants of the District. Persons with regional citizenship will not be obliged to serve in any army, as we demand the status of a demilitarized District .

Persons who do not have regional citizenship can acquire that only by decision of the District authorities.

Separate Courts, Curriculum, Currency

The government is appointed by the District parliament and will govern in the District, and its portfolios will be the following: interior affairs, finance, health and social issues, education, culture, religion, economy, agriculture, forestry, information, and protection of human rights.

We demand to have our police, our district and municipal courts, Serbian as the official language, education according to our curriculum, district mail service, and our own information service.

Besides our right to autonomously define relations within the District, we want to take part in the solving of certain matters important for the whole country, at least those concerning some of our rights and interests. Therefore we must have a representative in the Croatian parliament. Before making a decision concerning the rights and interests of the District or those important to us in any aspect, the Croatian president and parliament are obliged to seek the opinion of our District Assembly. The District Assembly must also have the right to initiate issues within the legislative capacity of the Croatian parliament.

We demand that District authorities have certain freedom to participate in international agreements (contracts). The District's government can suggest the Croatian authorities to accept an international agreement, and it must also be informed about negotiations with a foreign state, should those include issues of any importance for the District. Should an international agreement signed by Croatia violate the legal capacity of the District, law on implementation of that agreement cannot become valid without the consent of the District Assembly.

Obligations and Guarantees

Croatia has its representative in the District, who will represent the Croatian president, parliament, and government. Generally, he will represent Croatian interests there, and his function will be one of supervision.

The representative is appointed by the Croatian president, but only after agreeing on the person of the candidate with a representative of the District Assembly. If the agreement is not reached, the Croatian president chooses a candidate from a list of five—offered by our District parliament—and appoints them representative.

The representative would be a chairperson of a special body of experts, possibly called the District Committee. Half of its members would be appointed by the Croatian Government, and half by our District Assembly. The representative would execute his function through that District Committee.

As our previous experiences have been bad, we also want efficient international guarantees for consistent implementation of the Law on the Autonomy of the Serb District of Srem-Baranja, as well as guarantees of security, because of our status of a demilitarized region.

We want those double international guarantees to be granted by one, more, or all member states of the UN Security Council.

Croatia: Serbs Refuse UN Project on Refugees' Return

AU0506091096 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 25 May 96 p 4

[Article by J. Simic: "Serbs Neglected"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Serb side has not agreed with the first pilot project of the UN High Commissioner [for Refugees], according to which the Croat refugees would be allowed to return to Antunovac, Bilje, and Ernestinovo in eastern Slavonia, and Serbs only to the village of Kusonje in western Slavonia."

This was told to VECERNJE NOVOSTI yesterday by Vojislav Stanimirovic, president of the executive council for eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem.

"That offer does not suit us because it anticipates the return of 5,000 Croats to Bilje (Baranja), Antunovac and Ernestinovo (eastern Slavonia), whereas only 900 to 1,000 Serbs have the chance to return to Kusonje. That is a proportion of five to one to the disadvantage of the Serbs," Stanimirovic was categorical.

The president of the district government adds that the Serb side had asked that the Serbs be enabled to return to some other villages in the municipality of Okucani, which would roughly equalize the number of returnees from both sides.

"Another thing that does not suit us is that for the time being UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] insists only on the reciprocity of refugees from Croatia who are accommodated in this district. True, around 50,000 Croats left our district because of war circumstances, and the same number of Serbs from the western part of the [former self-proclaimed] Republic of Serbian Krajina settled here. But what will happen to around 150,000 Serbs who were displaced from Croatia to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?" Stanimirovic asks. "That is a ratio of eight or nine displaced Serbs to one refugee Croat. It would be more logical if more attention was paid to the return of Serb refugees with regard to the fact that there is a much bigger number of them."

The building of a pilot settlement was announced at the beginning of May by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, after her talks with the administrator Jacques Klein in Vukovar. Ogata then said that the first pilot settlements should be built this summer, for the beginning probably in western Slavonia.

That gave hope to many refugees from that part of the Republic of Serbian Krajina who are now in eastern Slavonia so that they buried administrator Klein with questions in the contact show that was shown last night on the "Beli Manastir" Television. However, his answer was not very encouraging.

"To be honest, the return of refugees is not a part of the mandate of UNTAES [UN Temporary Administration for Eastern Slavonia]," Klein said. "That is the work of UNHCR, which will stay on this terrain much longer than we, and which has a plan for refugees on the entire territory of former Yugoslavia. As far as I know, one of the plans is for Serbs to return to western Slavonia soon, and Croats and Hungarians to the villages Lipovac and Laslovo.

"Yet what I can guarantee," the U.S. general and diplomat added, "is that no one in the district will be moved out of the houses in which they are now staying before they are provided with alternative accommodation."

Poland: Minister Rosati Says Russia To Accept NATO Expansion

LD0506092796 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0600 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, who is participating in a meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in Berlin, has said that Poland will fulfill all of the criteria required for NATO membership, including civilian control of the Army. He stressed that Poland expects a decision on the acceptance of new members next year.

Asked whether the outcome of the presidential elections in Russia may influence the decision on acceptance of our country as a pact member, the minister said that every country has the right to decide to which organizations it wants to belong.

[Begin Rosati recording] Although this process should not be too hasty, it must be autonomous in the sense that third countries must not be allowed to decide what should happen within NATO.

Second, all political forces in Russia are saying in a unanimous chorus that they oppose NATO expansion. However, in my opinion, the Russian position has evolved. In fact, the Russians are preparing themselves to accept NATO expansion as a fact that cannot be avoided. [end recording]

Poland: Reaction to Primakov Statement on NATO Expansion

WS0506124596

[FBIS Report On 5 June, two Warsaw vernacular dailies, RZECZPOSPOLITA and GAZETA WYBORCZA, carried reactions to the statement on NATO expansion made by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council meeting in Bonn, which took place on the previous day.

RZECZPOSPOLITA on pages one and six carries a 800-word report by Wojciech Pomianowski from Berlin entitled "Dariusz Rosati: A New Element in Russia's Stand; NATO Expansion a Foregone Conclusion." After reporting on the meeting itself and statements by politicians who took part in it, including the statement by Russian Foreign Minister Primakov that Russia is not against NATO expansion but against the deployment of nuclear weapons and the establishment of military bases on the territories of new member states, the author quotes Foreign Affairs Minister Daruiusz Rosati as saying that Primakov's statement is a "new element in Russia's stand." However, according to Minister Rosati, the process of NATO enlargement will continue regardless of Moscow's approach and of the results of the Russian presidential elections. Issues related to nuclear weapons will be discussed not by NATO and Russia, but by NATO and the candidates for new member states of the alliance. Rosati points out that Poland is not submitting any conditions before these talks begin, even though he is satisfied to note that, in the current, very good international situation, there is no need to deploy nuclear weapons in our country. The head of the Polish diplomatic services rejected all of the earlier Russian suggestions that the East and Central European countries should give up the idea of joining NATO in return for security guarantees from the Western alliance.

The same daily on page six carries a 350-word editorial commentary by Jan Skorzynski entitled "No Changes in the East." The author wonders "what the new tactics of Moscow are." Skorzynski believes that the reasoning behind Primakov's Berlin statement may be the following: "If enlargement of the alliance is already a foregone conclusion, then it is worthwhile to try to weaken its importance. Hence, the proposal to give up the idea of establishing NATO military bases on the soil of countries that are applying for NATO membership. As a result, this may lead to the introduction of second-rate membership for the countries of East and Central Europe, which probably will not allow themselves to be stopped on their road to NATO." Skorzynski points out that "this less adamant stand taken by Primakov may meet with greater understanding in Western capitals than the persistent and firm 'no.' The temptation to reach a compromise, coupled with the desire to help Boris Yeltsin, may prevail over calm reasoning." Skorzynski adds that "Warsaw's perspective is different. Poland is interested only in full membership in all—both political and military—structures of NATO. Today it is worthwhile to say this once again: No changes in the East."

GAZETA WYBORCZA runs a front-page untitled 150-word commentary by Bartosz Weglarczyk. The author points out that because "so far NATO has not made any decision regarding its enlargement, yesterday's statements should be interpreted very cautiously and seen only as part of the discussion between NATO and Russia." Bartoszczyk notes that "the issue of nondeployment of nuclear weapons in Poland—once our country joins NATO—has practically been already decided. The alliance does not have political, military, or economic reasons to deploy these weapons on the territories of new member states. This problem has been brought up by opponents of NATO expansion, both those in the East and those in the West."

Poland: Italian President Arrives on Official Visit

LD0506095696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 0900 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro has arrived in Poland on an official visit. He will have talks with the president, the prime minister, and the Sejm and Senate speakers.

After Warsaw, the Italian guest will visit Krakow and Auschwitz. He will also take part in a summit meeting of the presidents of the Central European Initiative [CEI] countries in Lancut.

Poland: Official Previews Kwasniewski's U.S. Visit

WS0506120096 Warsaw Radio RMF FM Network in Polish 0605 GMT 5 Jun 96

[Interview with Marek Siwiec, secretary of state at the Polish Presidential Chancellery, by Tomasz Wroblewski in Washington—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Wroblewski] Our guest today in our Washington studio is Minister Marek Siwiec, who has come here to organize a three-day working visit to Washington by President Kwasniewski. Mr. Minister, to begin with, could you present the president's itinerary for the Washington trip? Whom will he meet, whom will he visit, and whom will he address?

[Siwiec] First and foremost, he will hold talks with President Clinton. Second, he will be a guest of the secretary of state. We will try to reach opinion-making circles. We are also going to meet with the leaders of Jewish organizations, which are particularly sensitive to issues concerning Jewish affairs in Poland, starting with the very ticklish issue of Oswiecim and the law on the restitution of Jewish property to issues connected with the anniversary of the pogrom in Kielce. The president wants to meet with the Polish community as well. One can also expect a strong military emphasis. The president, as the supreme commander in chief, is very interested in what the United States is currently doing with regard to military issues, and we consider the military element to be very important and indicating the substance of the Polish-U.S. relations and future relations between Poland and NATO.

[Wroblewski] You have been talking about the Washington part of the visit, but, as far as I understand, there will be another, longer visit to the United States by Aleksander Kwasniewski—that is, the president's visit to Atlanta two weeks after the visit to the White House.

[Siwiec] In Atlanta, the president will be a guest of President Clinton, just as many heads of state who have been invited to the inauguration of the Olympic games. As far as I know, the president will spend approximately one week in Atlanta. He has been connected with sports for a long time. He loves sports, and it is quite natural that he will promote Poland there as well. This visit will be of a completely different nature; it will be connected with the great sport and cultural event because this is exactly how one must view the Olympic games. In this sense, one should not mix politics with sports.

[Wroblewski] Who will pay for this, the Polish state or the Olympic Committee?

[Siwiec] The president will be a guest of the organizers, and the organizers will cover the expenses connected with this.

[Wroblewski] [Former] President Walesa is currently in Washington. Do you consider him a good ambassador of his state?

[Siwiec] I would not like to describe Lech Walesa's activities in categories of good or bad. If he is a public figure and is well known in the United States, I think it is completely normal that he speak about Poland and goes abroad. As far as I know, he presents Poland's aspirations (for which we are waiting to hear the U.S. stance) as a consensus that goes beyond our internal divisions. This is perhaps how serious and responsible Polish politicians should behave, be they future, former, or current politicians.

[Wroblewski] It seems that President Kwasniewski's visit to Washington will be overshadowed by the presidential elections in Russia, which absorbs the Americans very much. So our Eastern policy will certainly become a topic for discussions here. What strategy have you adopted?

[Siwiec] We must simply be prepared for any outcome. For the Poles, the most important thing is how our aspirations are implemented and what guarantees for Poland's security and good cooperation with Russia either candidate will provide. We are not a party to these elections. We would like to and will cooperate on a similar basis with the candidate who wins the elections. The fact that President Kwasniewski has had very creative and substantial talks with Boris Yeltsin is also a good sign for the United States, indicating that Poland is a country that can talk with Russia and is not an enfant terrible of Central Europe that could either irritate Russia or kneel before it.

[Wroblewski] There will be a meeting in the White House and a meeting in the Congress. Are meetings with journalists being planned?

[Siwiec] Of course. We are going to meet with journalists and opinion-making circles in different places. There is a great craving for knowledge about Poland here. It is easy to fall into some simplification or stereotype, just as it is hard to extricate oneself from this simplification. I think we should talk with journalists and present ourselves and our plans to them. It is the free press's feature that it is sometimes fastidious, but it must obtain a chance to become familiar with a politician and assess who he really is. Aleksander Kwasniewski is still relatively unknown in these circles. I believe that he will be able to convince them, as he has done in many places all over the world.

[Wroblewski] Yesterday we received a statement by Rabbi Weiss on the issue of a supermarket in Oswiecim. This is a reaction to the fact that Janusz Marszalek has resumed its construction. Weiss and, as I suspect, many Jewish circles are very concerned. How should we understand this, and how should we answer these Jewish organizations?

[Siwiec] Rabbi Weiss is a very controversial figure. As for Oswiecim, what is important is perhaps not what this rabbi thinks. What is really significant is the state's prestige and the authority of various state institutions. If the issue of Oswiecim represents an international problem, the Polish authorities should tackle this problem very seriously, and such a controversial issue as the construction of the supermarket must be resolved once and for all. My opinion—which, by the way, I have expressed on many occasions—is that the construction should not take place there. When I was asked why the Polish authorities are ineffective with regard to this matter, I said it is the case because there is a law that makes it possible to conduct such games. There were many legal assessments that halted the construction, but there is also a certain procedure that cannot be bypassed. I think the issue of Oswiecim should be treated as a great challenge for Poles and the Polish state with regard to the world Jewish community. This is a place where a Pole was the first victim, but 1.5 million Jews died there. We bear a particular responsibility. We should present how the issue of Oswiecim should be regulated once and for all to wise and open-minded Jewish circles. We should present a program concerning Oswiecim that will make it possible to look at it as a place of death, memory, and education, a place visited by millions of people, and, last by not least, a place where 50,000 residents of the city of Oswiecim live, who have the same rights, want to live normally, and want to be friendly to those millions of guests who visit Oswiecim.

[Wroblewski] Finally, what is the most difficult thing in preparation for such a visit?

[Siwiec] The most difficult thing is to make the right choice. The most difficult thing is to carve one's way through dozens of important people in Washington. The most difficult thing is to make the current and planned image of the Polish president, which results from his aspirations and plans, enter the consciousness of the U.S. elite and society. This sounds banal, but it is most difficult to achieve simple things, and I think that the entire preparations are focused on precisely calculating the political effect of this visit, which will take place almost on the eve of the implementation of our various aspirations connected with NATO and the building of Poland's prestige.

Poland: Prosecutor Waits for MSW Head To Reveal Agent 'O'

WS0406135696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik: "When Will the MSW Head Notify the Prosecutor's Office Who 'O' Is?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"The Prosecutor's Office is expecting information from [Interior] Minister Siemiatkowski on agent O. I will do everything possible to explain the issue," Prosecutor General [and Justice Minister] Leszek Kubicki told us yesterday.*

Minister Kubicki expects that any day now Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], will explain why he is not notifying the Prosecutor's Office of a criminal offense, despite the fact that he claims he knows the identity of O., the alleged collaborator of the Russian intelligence services. Siemiatkowski said at the Sejm: "Who is agent O.? The answer is in the report by the internal commission of the Office of State Protection [UOP]. Readers of that report have no doubt whatsoever that the answer is given."

The two ministers were to talk yesterday afternoon, but the MSW head unexpectedly called off the meeting. Kubicki told us yesterday that he would ask Siemiatkowski about agent O., even if it was only over the telephone.

Article 254 of the Criminal Code states that anyone who has any information about a spy and does not notify the prosecutor or the police immediately might be sentenced to prison for anywhere between six months and five years.

The Supreme Prosecutor's Office [NPW] has not been notified by Siemiatkowski to this day. "I do not know of any additional materials submitted to the prosecutor by the MSW or UOP that would allow the launch of investigative proceedings in the case of O.," NPW Spokesman Colonel Wlodzimierz Pospiech told us yesterday. He does not know why Minister Siemiatkowski told the media he had identified O. but did not notify the Prosecutor's Office. The spokesman presumes the interior minister may still not have proof.

"Has the interior minister violated the law by not notifying the Prosecutor's Office?" we asked Minister Kubicki.

"He has not had time yet."

"But the criminal code says 'immediately.'"

"I can assure you I will do my duty and ask the minister," replied Minister Kubicki.

Jacek Merkel (Freedom Union), a member of the Political Advisory Committee to the Interior Minister: "Theoretically speaking, the aim of any intelligence service is to 'target' a foreign agent and double him to disinform the enemy. If the interior minister reveals he knows who O. is, it means attempts at doubling him failed. Otherwise, nobody would know anything."

Poland: Prime Minister Cimoszewicz on Identity of Agent 'O'

WS0506121496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 5-6 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by "KNYSZ": "Prime Minister on Spies; Guessing Game"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Yesterday the prime minister formulated a new hypothesis on the identity of agent "O": He is an officer of the Office of State Protection [UOP], who was planted by our intelligence on the Russian secret services in the early 1990's.*

On "Signals of the Day" [program on First Program of Polish Radio] the prime minister said: "There is very serious evidence allowing one to establish who is hiding behind the code name of 'O' mentioned by Russian intelligence. This hypothesis will be examined. If it turns out to be true, it will mean the law was not violated. Perhaps this sounds very mysterious, but it might turn out that the agent is one of the officers of the Polish secret services. He played the role of a figurehead in a case against an individual who had been found to collaborate with the Russian intelligence services. He was planted by the secret services to carry out a ploy with the objective of gathering material against a real agent, later sentenced in court. That is the whole secret."

Janusz Zemke (Democratic Left Alliance): "That real agent who was sentenced is Marek Zielinski, a former major at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who was spying for Soviet intelligence services."

Former UOP Chief Gromoslaw Czempinski said the prime minister's hypothesis was an "overstatement": "It is theoretically possible. Everything is theoretically possible. However, I exclude it on practical grounds."

Former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski: "The note obtained by our intelligence services from a Russian source disclaims the prime minister's theory."

Konstanty Miodowicz, former chief of counterintelligence at the UOP: "The prime minister has been misled."

Romania: Envoy to U.S. 'Very Optimistic' About MFN, NATO

AU0406124796 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 30 May 96 p 6

[Interview with Mircea Geoana, Romanian ambassador to Washington, by Aura Titiriga in Bucharest; date not given: "Romania Has Every Chance To Obtain the Status on a Permanent Basis During the Current Legislative Period of the U.S. Congress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Titiriga] Mr. Ambassador Mircea Geoana, you are on a three-day visit in Romania. What made you come home now, four months after you were appointed to office?

[Geoana] I participated in the launching of several major U.S. projects in Romania. A delegation of the Tenneco company of the United States thus came to Romania for the inauguration of a joint wood extraction and processing company in Caras-Severin County. The U.S. National Association of Small Producers came here, too, for a similar purpose. Furthermore, documents were signed yesterday with the U.S. company CASE on an important project worth $90 million in the agricultural and food industry. Investments are to be made by the Pacific Enterprise company as well, which specializes in the business of natural gas and various other energy supplies. All this represents concrete forms of the unconditioned interest shown by U.S. corporations to engage in investments and do business with Romania. The preconditions do exist for the United States to climb to the top of the chart of Romania's foreign investors and reach a level matching the importance of our bilateral relations, as well as the economic power of the United States. Besides, this has been a good opportunity for me to exchange views with Romanian investors.

[Titiriga] Mr. Ambassador, recently I learned that Hillary Clinton, the first lady of the United States, is to arrive on a visit to Romania. Could you offer some further details?

[Geoana] Mrs. Clinton is to go on a Central European tour, which has both a political and humanitarian dimension. Hillary Clinton is known to be a leading personality in children's issues both in the United States and abroad. The political dimension is also highlighted by the fact that the U.S. first lady is to be received by President Ion Iliescu. This visit is proof of the importance granted by the U.S. Administration within its foreign policy.

[Titiriga] Recently PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] Executive President Adrian Nastase, as well as the Romanian Presidency, criticized certain Romanian ambassadors abroad. The reason was that they lack diplomatic training. What is you opinion on this?

[Geoana] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MAE] has made great efforts to create a class of career diplomats. They employed hundreds of young people after 1990. These people were offered the possibility to go to training courses and travel abroad on scholarships to perfect their training. This new generation ripened alongside the older one existing at the MAE, the latter obviously having more experience. However, one could not assert that the MAE has this sector entirely covered at a level fitting the dynamics of current international life. We welcomed the appointment, including at the ambassadorial level, to our diplomacy of various personalities belonging to our public life. In the future we will have to see whether this direction proves to be the most appropriate one for the Romanian diplomacy.

[Titiriga] Mr. Ambassador, the past few months have been dedicated, perhaps more than ever, to foreign policy issues, and this is not bad at all. These issues also include Romania's integration preoccupation within NATO....

[Geoana] In the United States debates on NATO expansion—both at the political and military but also academic levels—are fully underway. There are very good chances that by the beginning of 1997 the North Atlantic Alliance should take certain steps regarding the commencement of negotiations on the admittance of the candidate countries. Romania's progress on the political and democratic plane, but also in the military-strategic plane, as well as the way in which it is perceived, made the interest in Romania grow among all these U.S. circles. This makes me very optimistic about Romania's chances to be among the first Central European countries to commence such negotiations with NATO.

[Titiriga] It is unavoidable that my last question in this interview should refer to our chances to receive most favored nation [MFN] status on a permanent basis....

[Geoana] The debates in the U.S. Congress on the draft bills granting permanent MFN status are fully under way. Currently the issue, both in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, finds itself in the normal legislative-procedural examination stage at the level of the specialized committees. There is every chance that these bills will be passed during the current legislative period of the U.S. Congress.

Romania: Ratiu Expects Romania, Hungary To Enter NATO Together

AU0406125796 Bucharest VOCEA ROMANIEI in Romanian 30 May 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with Ion Ratiu, National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party deputy and head of the Romanian delegation to the North Atlantic Assembly, by Oana Cioboata; place and date not given: "Hungary Will Not Join NATO Without Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cioboata] Mr. Ion Ratiu, during the recent spring session of the North Atlantic Assembly, did you notice any significant change in the position of the member states toward Romania's admission into NATO?

[Ratiu] The meeting held in the capital city of Greece was very important, particularly with regard to the issue of NATO expansion toward the East. If before the Athens meeting there was a suspicion of a certain preference toward the more rapid admission of the Visegrad Group, today I do not believe that there is such a problem. I believe that our performance, especially within the Partnership for Peace, brought about this change of attitude toward Romania, which is now regarded with greater sympathy. We have made sustained efforts, and succeeded in convincing the North Atlantic Assembly that our country represents a constructive factor capable of strengthening the Alliance, not just one that expects to obtain the shield of guarantee and security offered by it.

[Cioboata] Do you believe that Romania will be among the first countries to be admitted into NATO?

[Ratiu] All I can say is that our position is currently better than it used to be. I hope Romania will enter in the first group. In the event our country is not admitted this fall, and a decision is made for the admission of only a few states, I believe that those states will be Poland and the Czech Republic. The second wave would include Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. In other words, I believe Hungary will not enter NATO without Romania.

[Cioboata] During the NATO Defense Council meeting held last month in Rome, Mr. Petre Roman formulated a proposal regarding the development of the Partnership for Peace as a separate institution of security in Europe, which stirred numerous disapproving commentaries in our country. What is your opinion regarding the possible effects of such a development?

[Ratiu] This position—and this is something I also emphasized in Athens—was an individual position, Mr. Petre Roman's personal suggestion, which had no connection with the official viewpoint of the Romanian delegation to NATO. I believe that Mr. Roman made an outburst and did not think too much of its consequences. However, I believe that this proposal—received also in Rome with bewilderment, and even with amusement as well by some European parliamentarians—will be forgotten and will not harm Romania's interest of being admitted into NATO, particularly considering that the respective proposal has been withdrawn. Had the proposal been repeated, it could have become very harmful, because it would have been an unhoped for excuse to some Western members to leave us behind.

Romania: Iliescu Reiterates 'Consensus' on Euro-Atlantic Option

AU0406204796 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In an interview granted this afternoon to Ernesto Corona, president of the Chilena Radio network and chairman of the Chilean Mass Media Association, Romanian President Ion Iliescu stated that due to the existing national consensus, Romania's European and Euro-Atlantic option will not change, regardless of the results of the legislative and presidential elections to be held this fall.

Furthermore, President Iliescu emphasized that privatization is also an issue that is broadly supported by the Romanian population, and the [2 June] local elections revealed that the people back the parties that favor market economy and social protection.

Talking about reasons for absenteeism in the Sunday balloting, the president said that one reason is the fact that the population has to put up with a great deal of difficulty in the current transition period.

Asked by the Chilean journalist whether he will run for again for the presidency, Ion Iliescu declared that he will make his decision public only after the conclusion of the local elections.

Romania: Opposition Wins More Votes Than Former Coalition

AU0406132696

[FBIS Report] Bucharest Radio Network in Romanian at 1000 GMT on 4 June carries a four-minute report on "certain irregularities noted by our correspondents" in the 2 June local elections. "The secretary of the local electoral council of Brasov called upon the Brasov prefect to drastically punish, up to dismissing, the director of the local ROMTELECOM branch for serious deficiencies in ensuring the necessary telephones links to the voting stations." The Sibiu branch of the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR] submitted a "written complaint to the Electoral Bureau of the

Sibiu Municipality Constituency," whereby it "demands a full recheck of all valid and void votes, in the presence of the party representatives." The announcer adds that "at a news conference organized today by the PDSR county branch, this request was motivated by the ascertainment of irregularities and deficiencies in the local elections there," such as—"Vote-counting was interrupted in four voting stations, with the bureau members leaving their posts; there are suspicions that voting slips at Voting Station No.72 were taken to another location before the records were submitted to the municipal constituency; there were voting slips with loose pages, which permitted their subsequent replacement; and there were also voting slips which could not be opened at the inner pages 2 and 3, where PDSR candidates were also mentioned; and the access of the voters to certain voting stations was not permitted after 2000 hours [1700 GMT]." In conclusion, the written complaint stresses that "if the above contestations are proved true, the PDSR county organization demands cancellation of the election results throughout Sibiu Municipality." According to PDSR representatives, "the ruling party's candidate has placed third in the election, with a difference of only 666 votes, behind the Social Democratic Union [USD] candidate, who came in second; the candidate of the Democratic Convention [CDR] ended up first."

According to the announcer, the Pro-Democratia [Pro-Democracy] Association organized a news conference at the headquarters of the Group for Social Dialogue today. The participants presented several preliminary conclusions on the 2 June election. "The Pro-Democratia observers have noted certain irregularities, which can be divided in two categories: organizational and fraud or fraud attempts." Marian Tata, president of the Pro-Democratia Association, is quoted as saying that "no significant frauds were noted, capable of influencing the results of the election," but, "because of the poor organization of the electoral process, these irregularities have made it incorrect." The announcer adds that "Marian Tata mainly blames the government, the city halls, and the electoral commissions for the poor conduct of the elections." However, "Tata believes that all parliamentary political groupings are responsible, to a smaller or larger extent, for this poor organization." The Pro-Democratia estimations for Bucharest indicate that "Victor Ciorbea, CDR candidate for the Bucharest Mayoralty, is ahead, followed by Ilie Nastase, PDSR, and Anton Vatasescu, USD."

According to the announcer, the leaders of the Liberal Party-1993 [PL'93] blame the government for the deficient organization of the elections. At a news conference today, PL'93 President Horia Rusu is quoted as saying that "the results obtained by his party's candidates in the first ballot are not satisfactory" and that "his party was set at a disadvantage by the electorate's lack of interest in the election per se and by the high degree of absenteeism." Another PL'93 leader Dinu Patriciu is quoted as saying that "for the first time, the opposition has obtained more votes than the overall sum of votes obtained by the former governmental coalition." Nevertheless, "Patriciu believes that the entire opposition should submit a coherent message to the electorate to enhance this positive phenomenon."

Romania: Cabinet Confirms 16 Jun Date for Repeat Ballot

AU0406141096 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1300 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The government held a meeting today at Victoria Palace, the government headquarters.

Invited to today's news conference at Victoria Palace, Octav Cozmanca, chairman of the Central Technical Commission for the Organization and Holding of Elections, made a statement in connection with the unfolding of the local elections in Bucharest and the counties. The government, he said, noted that this year's elections took place in accordance with Law No.70 and the nine relevant decisions adopted by the executive branch. In the 2,054 electoral constituencies, with 14,620 voting stations, Mr. Cozmanca said, the deficiencies noted are individual cases that cannot cast any doubt on the correctness of the election as a whole, and he assessed that the government has fulfilled its duties and taken the necessary steps to ensure proper development of the elections. The Central Technical Commission distributed the local public administration clerks in the counties; analyses and teleconferences were held at Victoria Palace; and the necessary stamps, forms, and so forth were ensured. The rather slow pace of the electoral process is primarily due to the participation of more than 250,000 candidates from 143 parties. The lack of ink and identification signs at the voting stations is due to the lack of interest displayed by local bodies.

The government adopted measures to ensure proper holding of the repeat ballot—in the localities where less than 50 percent plus one of the electorate went to the polls on 2 June—and of the second ballot, next Sunday 16 June. At today's meeting, the government decided on several immediate measures, such as printing voting cards, posting the lists of candidates, opening additional ballot boxes and voting cabins.

At this time, Mr. Octav Cozmanca is answering questions from journalists. So far, he said that a meeting with the representatives of the parliamentary political parties is scheduled for tomorrow, at 1500 hours [1200 GMT], to discuss issues pertaining to the general and presidential elections and the new Law on the Political Parties. Next Friday [7 June], a new meeting will be held with the parties to assess the conduct of the 2 June local elections and prepare the second ballot on 16 June.

Romania: Cabinet To Improve Conditions for Election Runoff

AU0406173996 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] During its meeting today the Romanian Government examined the way in which the 2 June 1996 local elections were organized and took place.

On the basis of the figures and other information supplied so far, the executive found that the preparations, organization, and execution of local elections was done in concordance with Law 70 of 1991 on local elections, as well as the nine decisions made by the government with respect to the way in which this law should be implemented.

The balloting was organized in 2,954 local constituencies, 2,686 communes, 182 cities, six districts, and 80 municipalities, at a total number of 14,620 polling stations.

The fact that at some of the polling stations certain shortcomings were noted, in rather isolated cases, should not lead to generalized conclusions that cast doubts over the fairness of the elections in general.

According to legal stipulations, concrete responsibility in the process of preparing, organizing, and holding local elections lies with the following bodies: the government, through its Central Technical Electoral Commission, as well as its county elections technical commissions; the electoral bureaus; and the mayoral offices in communes, cities, and municipalities. The government states that the involvement of each of these bodies has to be judged solely by comparing it to their responsibilities as established by law.

Examining the concrete unfolding of the 2 June balloting, the government found the existence of certain shortcomings, which—although they did not fundamentally bias the electoral process—rendered the ballot casting more difficult. In connection with this the executive mentions deficiencies with respect to the way in which the permanent electoral lists were drawn up, certain errors made in the printing of the voting slips, and negative aspects regarding the organization and functioning of the polling stations.

In connection with the problem of the lack of stamp pads and stamp ink, widely circulated by the press, as well as the fact that voters found it difficult to find their polling stations, as there were no indicator arrows, the government points out that these shortcomings are due to the lack on interest and responsibility of certain mayors, who during this electoral campaign eschewed the carrying out of their most elementary legal duties.

Examining the extremely low turnout, which barely exceeded 50 percent in many of the localities, the cabinet assessed that although this fact in itself cannot be considered a feature that is exclusively characteristic for Romania, as similar percentages were also registered in other countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Bulgaria, that percentage could have been higher if there had been more advertising in the media, especially on the national radio and television networks. Furthermore, the turnout would have also been higher had the political parties and the government made more efforts.

The cabinet established a set of measures intended to be implemented immediately to repeat the elections in the places where the turnout was below 50 percent, and to hold the second round of balloting to elect mayors. These elections will take place on Sunday, 16 June 1996.

By means of the concrete actions to be taken in the following days, the Central Technical Electoral Commission, the local commissions, the electoral bureaus, as well as the mayoral offices are to ensure the elimination of the highlighted malfunctions. Thus they are to grant utmost attention to the printing of the ballot slips, the strict observance of the order of the candidates, which is to be established by draw, and the posting of the candidate lists in polling stations. They are to ensure a greater number of ballot boxes and booths, appropriate lighting in the ballot booths, the and existence of the necessary stocks of materials and office supplies. In this respect the government intends to counterweigh the poor performance of the mayoral offices.

The government expresses its belief that by implementing the established measures it will manage to ensure the holding, under the best circumstances, of the second round of balloting on 16 June, and avoid the recurrence of certain shortcomings noted during the first round of on 2 June, says the communique released by the government.

Slovenia: Thaler Reports on NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting

AU0406145196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 4 Jun 96

[Report by Edo Zitnik from Berlin—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Slovene Foreign Minister Thaler used the morning part of the session of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting for some bilateral contacts. He said that the Italian chief of diplomacy Dini was optimistic regarding the signing of our EU associate membership agreement next week.

Slovenia presented Great Britain with a memorandum citing the arguments in favor of lifting the British veto. Thaler nevertheless admits that the matter is completely in the hands of the British Government.

He judges the perspectives of our contacts with Italy to be considerably better now. The Italian and the Slovene defense ministers are expected to meet soon. Thaler believes that Slovenia is the main candidate for NATO membership, which his talks in Berlin allegedly supported.

During last night's meeting of the U.S. Secretary of State Christopher with the 12 partner states, Christopher, according to Thaler, supported the resolution of our problems with Italy. As Thaler said, Christopher assured him that Washington would, even in the future, favor the speediest possible signing of our associate membership.

Slovenia: Drnovsek Optimistic About Social Pact Prospects

AU0306100296 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 30 May 96 p 1

[Article by Jelena Gacesa: "Social Pact Finally Signed"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 29 May—"We know how demanding the negotiations were, that there is an entire series of questions that need resolving. We are happy that we managed to sign such an important document this year and that we will be able to preserve the system of social negotiations as one of the fundamental categories of state management."

With these words Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek invited the social partners to ceremonially sign the second Slovene social pact. He congratulated all the participants on the results achieved, for choosing the only responsible way to manage the country, which cannot be said for a system of blackmail, threats, and pressures. He voiced belief that signing the social pact will help encourage economic growth and increase competitiveness. He was also of the opinion that it would be possible to preserve political and social stability, thanks to which Slovenia has been ahead of some other countries so far. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: LDS Council Decides Against Breakup of Coalition

AU0506083196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2000 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite earlier announcements, the council of Liberal Democracy [LDS] did not break off the coalition agreement with the Christian Democrats [SKD] this evening. As the party president Janez Drnovsek said, the decision about this was passed unanimously. Sandi Frelih reports:

[Begin recording] [Frelih] We can only speculate about the reasons why the LDS council did not break off the coalition agreement with the SKD and sign an agreement on participation in the government until the end of the mandate instead.

LDS President Janez Drnovsek announced this possibility on Friday; however, directly prior to the session of the council all present received a document that had previously also been forwarded to the SKD. After the debate, Drnovsek only stated that the council deemed the no-confidence stance toward the foreign minister as failed, unnecessary, and nonstate forming conduct by individual political parties and the coalition partner; in brief, an action that did not help Slovenia's international position.

[Drnovsek] As regards the coalition and the coalition agreement, the party council believes that in view of the short time left until the end of the mandate, it would make no sense to break off the coalition agreement. However, the LDS will try to realize the tasks that remain before us by the end of the mandate, that is, the main projects, such as EU associate membership, the NATO pact, package of economic measures, and some other measures. Here, the LDS will also seek the support of other parliamentary parties and not merely the SKD. Formally speaking, the coalition agreement has not been broken off and the coalition remains in place.

[Frelih] What about the draft agreement?

[Drnovsek] We discussed two possibilities. One possibility was to break off the current coalition agreement and sign a new agreement for the interim period, which would define the tasks and also mutual relations for this period. The other possibility was not to break the coalition agreement at all, to keep it in place until the end of the mandate. The majority of the council members and I personally supported the second possibility, that is, not to break off the agreement.

[Frelih] So what will relations be like following the dismissal of the foreign minister, I mean relations between the coalition parties?

[Drnovsek] Very rational, probably. We will try to carry out projects where we need the parliamentary support. In such cases, I believe, we must act in a constructive manner and not allow sentiments to prevail. We voiced our disapproval with the behavior of the Christian Democrats, but we believe that we are bound to our citizens to carry our tasks through and not allow our discontent and other feelings to take over. The government and the parliament must continue to function and we must secure majority support for the projects that the Slovenes need. [end recording]

Slovenia: SDS Move for Change to Electoral System Assessed

AU0406180796 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 27 May 96 p 3

[Commentary by Vladimir Vodusek: "'We Taught Him Well'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The collection of signatures for the change of the electoral system carried out by the Social Democratic Party represents an attack on the wallets of the skeptics, many of whom bet at least a dinner that one simply could not gather 40,000 signatures. The realists were a little more prudent in saying that it would be difficult to gather so many signatures, but if anyone in the country could do it then it would be the president of the Social Democratic Party of Slovenia [SDS]. Of course, there is a third group of people who are active in serious politics and who leave nothing to chace. As precautionary measures, they planted some obstacles and security mechanisms in case the Social Democrats nevertheless collected the sufficient number of signatures.

The first obstacle was the State Chamber speaker, then the State Council became engaged, followed by the action by 35 deputies. Ultimately, there is always the Constitutional Court, which has already halted preparations for a referendum on changes to the electoral system.

Although Slovene politics has been as preoccupied with the phenomenon that is the SDS president [Janez Jansa] since the mid-1980's almost as much as with other state tasks, it nevertheless seems that he takes it by surprise over and over again. He is thrown out of the government palace only to return through the main gate of the parliament with 40,000 signatures, proving that he is actually indestructible. The tight circle of old friends, who recall the good old days when the party was still "capable of action" and mobilizing people virtually overnight, commented on the success of the action of the signature collection with nostalgia, saying "See, we thought well of him."

Although various stories have been doing the rounds recently about how the people were being taken to the municipal building from Ljubljana market so that they could sign for the majority system or that a school principal had asked a cleaner whether she had her identity card with her so she could go and sign the petition, these rather incredulous stories do not alter the fact that the signatures have been collected.

Of course, there will be no majority system because the Constitutional Court has already blocked the proposal by the group of 35 deputies that modifies only slightly the present electoral system and suspends the national lists. The initiatives by the State Council and the Social Democrats might suffer a similar fate.

However, the mechanisms, which are formally only available to official politics, were tested after a long period of time, as was the actual possibility of people speaking their mind. The last one to check out such formal possibilities of the Constitution, the law, and democracy was Ivan Kramberger, who managed to collect enough signatures to run as the presidential candidate in the 1992 elections.

While the signatures were still being collected, there was a lot of talk about the change to the law on referendum and the people's initiative in the article that suspends the collection of signatures for a consultative referendum, which is something similar to what happened in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. Namely, the opposition there managed to collect 150,000 signatures for early elections but, just as they tried to hand them over, the Sobranje changed the law and the signatures remained nothing but a pile of paper.

Regardless of the fact that there will obviously be no referendum on the electoral system before the elections and that after the elections nobody will bother to play with the electoral system but will be more interested in the shape of the coalition, the Social Democrats have nevertheless succeeded. Actually, they carried out a sort of preelection and tested the strength of the party apparatus. Their political adversaries saw the Social Democrats collecting the signatures merely as confirmation that "there was something authoritarian" about them.

Of course, nobody went so far as to state publicly what has already been said in history once, namely, that "Social Democracy is a twin sister of Fascism"; however, some people meditated aloud that only authoritarian leaders and parties succeed in such projects.

The collection of signatures is, regardless of the fact that the present nomenclature is not ready for any major changes, a democratic form of expressing people's will that is permitted by the law. The whole thing is chiefly confined to the boundaries of the power struggle and the rules of the game.

The president of the Social Democrats remains a sort of Don Quixote fighting the "mafia mills" and all the political parties to boot, since none of the political parties officially endorsed the majority electoral system. In brief, he is locking horns with the entire nomenclature. Even if all the obstacles were to fall and the Social Democrats were to get the referendum and changes to the electoral system, about which they would, of course, have to convince the deputies, different coalitions would be formed in the electoral period, and, above all, each political group would engage its voters to the utmost.

The elections would, in this case, sound like "Are you for or against Jansa?" The Social Democrats with their signatures remain the bad conscience of the present politicians, who are calculating what percentage of the electorate the Social Democrats have and consoling themselves with the fact that there is a certain percentage of dissatisfied people in any system.

Federal

FRY: Sarajevo Media Reports Bosnian Delegation To Visit FRY

LD0406133196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1304 GMT 4 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 4 (TANJUG)—A high-level delegation of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is expected to visit Belgrade next week, Sarajevo media reported on Tuesday.

The visit was agreed at the Geneva summit of Dayton peace accord signatories at the weekend, the sources said.

The sources said that the Federation delegation would discuss restoring postal and railway communications and trade.

This is the first visit by a Federation delegation to the capital of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Sarajevo papers announce the possibility of an establishment of relations with Belgrade.

After recent talks with Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, prime minister of the Muslim government in Sarajevo Hasan Muratovic said that they had agreed that the Federation could not play an important role in meetings on Balkan problems without previously establishing relations with Serbia, that is Yugoslavia.

FRY: Normalized Relations To Be Pursued With IMF, EU

LD0406163196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1551 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 4 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav government on Tuesday discussed the country's monetary policy to the end of year, the Information Secretariat said in a statement released after the session presided by Prime Minister Radoje Kontic.

The government stands firm on the position that the monetary policy until the end of the year will have to be conducive to the implementation of the overall economic policy, particularly in preserving a stable exchange rate of the national currency and realizing production and export plans.

The government said that the monetary policy, as the main instrument for preserving stability of a currency, should be based on the real foreign currency reserves and follow the pace of the production growth and the realization of export targets.

The National Bank of Yugoslavia should take adequate monetary measures to secure a stable exchange rate of the dinar and to stimulate production and export.

The government maintains that full financial discipline is needed and supports all activities of the central bank aimed at controlling the financial reliability and lawfulness of the banks and other financial organizations.

The government said the main objectives of the monetary policy were conducive to a normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions.

The government determined a platform for talks between Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and a European Union delegation which is expected to arrive on an official visit to Yugoslavia at the end of the week.

The E.U. thus responds to Yugoslavia's initiative to normalize relations and restore all forms of cooperation and the visit is expected to help the economic reconstruction and stabilization of the situation in the region.

The government also adopted a platform for talks between Yugoslav officials and president of the Hague International Tribunal in Belgrade later this month, the statement said.

FRY: PM Kontic, Swedish Envoy Discuss Promotion of Ties

LD0406175396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1636 GMT 4 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 4 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and Swedish Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Anders Bjorner on Tuesday discussed the restoration and upgrading of the two countries' relations, the Yugoslav information secretariat said in a statement.

Kontic and Bjorner agreed that a series of measures at the inter-state level should follow the return of numerous Swedish companies to the Yugoslav market and create atmosphere for a speedier and comprehensive bilateral cooperation.

It was agreed to analyse and extend numerous inter-state agreements, primarily those on economic and cultural cooperation, to spur on and protect investments and avoid double taxation.

The Yugoslav prime minister praised Sweden for its unbiased and principled attitude in the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, which was a substantial contribution to its settlement.

Speaking about the implementation of the Dayton agreement, Bjorner said that the Swedish Government appreciated Yugoslavia's peace policy since the beginning of the crisis and hoped that Yugoslavia would continue making crucial contributions to the stabilization of peace in the Balkans.

Kontic stressed Yugoslavia's readiness to continue investing efforts for a consistent implementation of the Dayton agreement, in which Yugoslavia rightly expected comprehensive support by other countries and international institutions.

Kontic said that Yugoslavia could realize the crucial role of a stabilizing factor in the region only if it was stable and prosperous itself, which is why it must become an equal member of the international community, the statement quoted Kontic as saying.

FRY: Discussions With German Faction on Dayton Accord

LD0406165096 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1604 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 4 (TANJUG)—A delegation of the foreign policy committees of the Yugoslav parliament's two houses met in Belgrade on Tuesday with a delegation of the German Bundestag "Alliance 90—Green" faction.

The delegations discussed the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Yugoslav delegation, headed by President of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Yugoslav Parliament's Upper House Slobodan Babic, and MP'S Gert Pope and Angelika Kerster Losak paid special attention to the implementation of the civilian aspect of the agreement.

The Yugoslav parliament said in a statement it had been stressed that Yugoslavia was interested in the full implementation of the Dayton agreement and holding of Bosnia elections within schedule.

Yugoslavia is interested in reintegrating in all international organizations and institutions, which would create conditions for its full economic recovery and further democratic development, it was heard in the talks.

It was said that human rights had been guaranteed to all citizens of Yugoslavia, but that part of the Albanian national minority in Serbia's southern province of Kosovo and Metohija, acting under pressure of separatist leaders, did not wish to exercise these rights because they did not recognize legal authorities.

A strong separatist movement has been active in Kosovo and Metohija for decades, aiming at detaching the province from Serbia and Yugoslavia and annexing it to neighbouring Albania.

FRY: Aid Association Appeals for Rights of Refugees

LD0406212096 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2055 GMT 4 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 4 (TANJUG)—A refugee aid association in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia said on Tuesday that Yugoslavia could hardly feed and clothe the more than 600,000 refugees in its care, let alone deal with their repatriation and integration problems.

The association adopted a declaration calling on all signatories to the Dayton accords and international factors to help give equal repatriation rights to the Serb refugees from Croatia and those from Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The association forwarded the declaration to international relief agencies and other institutions and held a news conference in connection with its publication.

Association President Milorad Muratovic reproached the world community for going against international humanitarian norms and leaving the question of Serbs' return to Croatia to be dealt with bilaterally between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The declaration said that the Muslim authorities in Sarajevo had passed legislation requiring refugees to apply by June 15 to be given their homes back and to obtain identity papers from the local authorities and the house owners' permission to return.

The association has processed 2,000 family requests, mostly from Serbs, to be allowed to return to the south Bosnian city of Mostar which has been under the European Union's administration for two years, but nothing has been done about them, the document said.

The association asked international bodies to make it possible for the refugees in Yugoslavia to visit their homes in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially in the big cities, and to obtain guarantees of respect for their rights and personal property.

Serbia

Serbia: Lawyer Criticizes Hague Tribunal's Use of CIA Evidence

AU0406160196 Belgrade POLITIKA EKSPRES in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by N. Stojcevic: "CIA Tailors 'Justice'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At The Hague Tribunal for war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, it is Serbs who are being prosecuted in most of the cases, and frequently on the basis of evidence that, in most cases, is no such thing. This is so because the chosen interpreters of justice in The Hague are using evidence in legal proceedings that the CIA acquired through espionage.

We asked Radoslav Nedic, chairman of the Belgrade Chamber of Lawyers, whether it is possible to refute such "evidence."

"Of course it is because they violate the basic principle of the fair treatment of the parties involved in a lawsuit, which is, so to say, a Bible in the legal profession. On one hand, we have the powerful CIA, while on the other hand, we have helpless individuals. Therefore, any indicted person has a right to call into question, through his or her lawyer, the use of such evidence. The most efficient way, however, would be to appeal to the U.S. federal court because the CIA is a U.S. agency, and it would be logical that the use of the agency's materials for the aforementioned purposes is sanctioned by a U.S. court," Nedic says.

Still, the most important thing, according to lawyer Nedic's assessment, is the fact that such a legal action to refute the use of evidence acquired through espionage in legal proceedings could produce a twist in the situation. It would disclose a conspiracy by the world's major players, the goal of which is to prove the guilt of the Serbs by all means available, even using illegal ones, while it is not known whether the same kind of evidence is used in legal actions against Croats or Muslims.

"As a man whose profession is the law, I refer solely to the principle of fair treatment in legal proceedings, which is particularly sacred in the United States and which must be carefully observed. What the world players must not forget at this moment is that any such unfair treatment automatically benefits the party that is treated unfairly," Nedic says.

Serbia: 'Military Experts' Estimate Deaths, Damage in Bosnia

AU0406133896 Paris AFP in English 1311 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 4 (AFP)—Between 130,000 and 150,000 people were killed in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, press reports Tuesday quoted Belgrade military experts as saying.

Bosnian government figures issued last October put the number of killed or missing at 146,817.

The experts, quoted by the weekly SVEDOK, said that at least 100,000 civilians died in the nearly four-year war.

They said that $80-billion worth of damage was caused, including damage to roads, factories, bridges, towns destroyed by bombardments and other infrastructure, and not including damage to priceless cultural treasures.

Serbia: Sandzak SDA Suggests Bosniak Election Coalition

AU0306161096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0953 GMT 1 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Pazar, 1 June (BETA)—Rasim Ljajic, chairman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] for Sandzak, has assessed that it would be very important for the state to make possible "the return of Sulejman Ugljanin and all the Bosniaks who were expelled from Sandzak or left the country fearing mobilization."

"Apart from botching proclamations, these authorities must prove by concrete moves that they do not treat the Bosniaks as second-class citizens," Ljaic stated for the BETA agency following the announced return of former Sandzak SDA Chairman Sulejman Ugljanin.

Ljajic said that differences in political attitudes with Ugljanin did not mean that the SDA wanted to gain a political profit from his absence.

According to Ljajic, Ugljanin has realized that his absence from political life did "great political damage to the Bosniaks."

"Although we who have favored participation in elections have been called traitors to our people, we shall not pay attention to that and will try to amend the consequences of a wrong political decision," Ljajic said.

Ljajic said that the SDA supports the creation of a joint Bosniak election list, with due regard for existing differences, because that is "the only way for the Bosniaks to win a few assembly seats."

"In such a way, we would affirm our political legitimacy and prove that the JUL [Yugoslav United Left] is an artificial, inflated balloon that just flew over Sandzak," Chairman Ljajic added.

Serbia: Mira Markovic Comments on Kasagic, Democracy, PRC

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[Article by Mira Markovic, president of the Directorate of the Yugoslav Left: "Fear of 'Democracy'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] 16 May, Thursday—I saw Rajko Kasagic, the prime minister of the Serb Republic who was suddenly removed yesterday, only once, aboard an airplane on which I travelled to Rome with my husband. As I greeted him, I thought—he will not stay there long.... In Pale, I thought. He has a rather mild face. He does not look like the others.

17 May, Friday—Sometimes a single word provokes a reaction that, in its intensity and content, shows that the word was the right one. Without that reaction, doubt would remain if the word was well chosen.

20 May, Monday—At the beginning of the twenties, democracy became a holy word. All public behavior—collective and individual—had to express its loyalty to democracy before it was expressed in any other way.

I might be wrong, but I have the impression that loyalty to democracy, the holiness of democracy, is particularly present in the countries of eastern and central Europe, former socialist countries. An awareness has been formed in them—both collective and individual—that their survival in the modern world directly depends on the degree of their stated loyalty to democracy.

Also, the notion of democracy in those countries, and elsewhere too, is now less clear than it was before. Science does not speak about democracy. Intellectuals avoid talking about it from the scientific and theoretic point of view. Politicians treat it as the right of their opponents not to choose means in the struggle for power, the right that they despise but that they dare not dispute, in order not to insult the sanctity. Laymen from more primitive structures believe that democracy is their right to get even with all those who are in their way and whom they dislike. And laymen from more cultivated structures understand democracy as the right to express their opinions on everything, particularly on what they know little about. Without any responsibility, of course.

All in all, the attitude towards democracy is an attitude towards a loyalty that must be publicly expressed. It is seen as a selective freedom that has no limits and that removes responsibility from those who have the right to it, but also as a lack of the possibility for those who have no right to that freedom to protest against it publicly and protect themselves from the unlimited freedom of others.

So two polarized states can be noticed. One is expressed as arrogance, the other as helplessness. The former, the arrogant ones, are fed on the helplessness of the latter. It will become increasingly present and increasingly brutal, incited by the lack of any obstacles, the lack of any responsibility. The latter, the helpless ones, become increasingly helpless, before the unlimited arrogance of the former. They will avoid raising their voices against the most brutal violence and against any sort of manipulation, even against the same injustice that the twentieth century, at the start, refused to ignore, regardless of the price that had to be paid for that refusal.

I am afraid that the fear of democracy, i.e. the fear of the wrongly understood democracy, will legalize violence, prostitution, crime, kitsch, exploitation, humiliation, poverty, primitivism, superstition—a lack of freedom. And introduce—new slavery.

21 May, Tuesday—The rightwingers in Serbia refer to the People's Republic of China with unmeasured resentment. They use it as a parameter for all the ethical, political, and esthetic characteristics that they have a negative attitude towards. When they wish to insult people here in the FRY, then they associate them with China—they say that they either have economic cooperation with China, they support Chinese society, they have friends in China, or they are just about to travel to China.... Anything that involves China is seen as an export of evil that is brought to Serbia and to the FRY.

Some of the reasons for the attitude of Serbia's right wing towards China are based on an outdated ideological and political understanding of the modern world. But it is possible that there are some other reasons that are unknown to me. In any case, all those reasons, the ones I know about and those I can only assume, originate from the outsider position of those who base their political behavior on those reasons. [sentence as published]

First of all, China today is a country of interest. In the last few years an impressive number of economic, financial, political, cultural, trade and diplomatic channels have led to China. Just as Chinese politicians are greeted with the highest respect in all capitals of the world, their diplomats are greeted at airports, their businessmen are greeted in governments and companies, their scientists are greeted at universities and institutes....

The rightwingers in Serbia are not only conservative (like most right-wing parties in the world), they are also uneducated, uninformed, and have bad manners. If they were not uneducated, they would know that, in all times and regardless of everything, China is an important country; if they were not uninformed, they would know that today China is a country of interest; and if they did not have bad manners, they would at least know how to hide their ignorance with good manners, which, fortunately, are increasingly appreciated, both in the East and in the West.

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